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CONCEPTUALIZING AGGRESSION
NOAH WEISBORD*
The special working group tasked by the International Criminal Court’s
Assembly of States Parties to define the supreme international crime, the
crime of aggression, has produced a breakthrough draft definition. This
paper analyzes the key concepts that make up the emerging definition of
the crime of aggression by developing and applying a future-oriented
methodology that brings together scenario planning and grounded
theory. It proposes modifications and interpretations of the constituent
concepts of the crime of aggression intended to make the definition
sociologically relevant today and in the foreseeable future.

INTRODUCTION
The crime of aggression—individual responsibility for illegal war—is
one of the core international crimes.1 The Nuremberg Tribunal called
aggression “the supreme international crime.”2 The judges reasoned that it
contained within it the accumulated evil of the entire war.3 Aggression has
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1. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 246-59 (2001) (including the crime of
aggression as one of the major international crimes).
2. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals
421 (1946) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
3. Id. (“War is essentially an evil thing. . . . To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only
an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that
it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”). The IMT found twelve defendants guilty
of the crime against peace. Id. at 485-528. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East in Tokyo
convicted twenty-four defendants of aggression. Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East, reproduced in 103 THE TOKYO MAJOR WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE JUDGMENT, SEPARATE
OPINION, PROCEEDINGS IN CHAMBERS, APPEALS AND REVIEWS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 49,773-49, 851 (R. John Pritchard ed., 1998).
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also been the most difficult international crime to define.4 It is included in
the International Criminal Court Statute along with Genocide, Crimes
Against Humanity, and War Crimes, but it is the only one without a
definition. Without a definition, it cannot be prosecuted. This article
examines the current definitional project from the perspective of a
participant-observer. It wrestles with the imperatives of fidelity to the past
and preparedness for the future, certainty and flexibility, and the possible
versus the desirable, which pervade the activity of lawmaking generally.
The crime of aggression is exceptionally difficult to define because it
is intertwined with a number of unresolved historical debates within the
field of international law, such as the distinction between a just and an
unjust war, the possibility of holding individuals responsible for collective
acts of political violence,5 and the appropriate relationship of judicial to
political institutions—such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
the UN Security Council—in the international order.6 Furthermore, the
definition has political and military repercussions for states and, as a result,
their negotiation positions tend to reflect their strategic interests, which are
regularly in competition. Finally, legal scholars and diplomats, wounded by
repeated setbacks, question the wisdom of the overall project.7
Proponents of the definitional project anticipate that an implemented
crime will discourage political and military leaders from using armed force
as a strategy because it may jeopardize them personally.8 Legal scholar
Mark Drumbl argues that a definition will carry with it an important
expressive function.9 Former Nuremberg Prosecutor Benjamin Ferencz
warns that not implementing the crime at this stage is regressive and that it

4. See Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 161, 168 (2008) (engaging
in a brief historical account of the development of the crime of aggression).
5. See generally HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL (Penguin Books 1994) (1965).
6. See generally Carrie McDougall, When Law And Reality Clash—The Imperative of
Compromise in the Context of the Accumulated Evil of the Whole: Conditions for the Exercise of the
International Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction over the Crime of Aggression, 7 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 277
(2007) (discussing the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the UN Security
Council).
7. See, e.g., Matthias Schuster, The Rome Statute and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian Knot
in Search of a Sword, 14 CRIM. L.F. 1 (2003) (discussing the difficulties of defining aggression and
questioning the wisdom of attempting to do so).
8. See generally Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent
Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7 (2001) (discussing how criminal accusations jeopardize the
political objectives of those who would use force to realize their ambitions).
9. Mark A. Drumbl, The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains?, 41
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 291, 291 (2009).
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will send a dangerous message: that international aggression is not
blameworthy.10
Some opponents, on the other hand, argue that national security is not
an area where international law is useful or desirable.11 The risk, they warn,
is that criminal prosecution will increase political tensions, harden
positions, and undermine alternative avenues to achieving peace and
security, such as negotiated solutions.12 Others, concerned for the integrity
of the Westphalian system of sovereign states, reject the notion of
individual responsibility in international law altogether.13
There is little relating to the transnational use of force that is
uncontroversial. Almost any set of norms or concepts that we might apply
to these questions could be debated or problematized by philosophic or
theoretical argument. My purpose in this article is not to engage in that
normative debate, which I may take up elsewhere, because I see it as a
potential distraction from the concrete and immediate task of drafting this
definition. Rather, I want to take as given certain goals and objectives that I
think are shared by the majority of the participants in this debate and, from
this basis, to translate these agreed premises into an operationalizable
process that will generate a definition of aggression that best fits with those
goals. The premise of the majority of the participants, stated broadly, is that
an implemented definition will advance the goals of peace and justice set
out in the preamble to the Rome Statute that established the ICC.

10. See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression, 41 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 281, 290 (2009) (arguing that failing once again to define the crime of aggression will
effectively provide aggressors a renewed mandate to initiate and wage illegal wars). See also LARRY
MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 319-41 (2008) (summarizing the broad arguments for
and against criminal trials for aggression).
11. E.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539 (2002) (concluding that
Article 51 of the UN Charter, which limits the use of force in self-defense, has been so frequently
violated by states that it cannot survive as a guide to United States policy-makers in the war on
terrorism); Michael J. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A37
(arguing that repeated transgressions of the prohibition on the use of force have destroyed that maxim
of international law). See also Michael J. Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939
(2005) (using the demise of the prohibition on the use of force to demonstrate his comprehensive theory
of desuetude); Michael J. Glennon, Terrorism and the Limits of Law, WILSON Q., Spring 2002, at 12
(noting the pitfalls of strict adherence to abstract legal constructs and the need to balance law and legal
theory with practical reality).
12. Andrew Natsios, “Waltz With Bashir: Why the Arrest Warrant Against Sudan's President Will
Serve Neither Peace nor Justice,” FOREIGN AFF., Mar. 23, 2009, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/
articles/64904/andrew-natsios/waltz-with-bashir?page=show (last visited Oct. 29, 2009).
13. The United States has taken this position as one basis for its refusal to become a state party to
the ICC. Stuart W. Risch, Hostile Outsider of Influential Insider? The United States and the
International Criminal Court, ARMY LAW., May 2009, at 61, 76.
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My project, therefore, considers the manner in which those involved
in drafting the definition of the crime of aggression go about the task of
conceptualizing the notion. Specifically, I am interested in suggesting
techniques to aid these drafters in more clearly understanding, specifying,
and operationalizing their underlying normative and conceptual
commitments. In so doing, I aim to help the process of drafting the
definition to converge upon and best fit with, in a clear and rigorous
fashion, the sociological and geopolitical phenomena that the participants
hope it will address.
This research explores the definition of the crime of aggression along
three dimensions. The first is an exploration of the definition as times
change and we move from past to future wars. The second dimension
engages with the challenge of reaching an actual agreement in a context of
frequently countervailing political and analytic (or academic) demands.
Here, I am reminded of the joke about the economist who questions her
colleague’s proposal: “sure, it’ll work in practice, but will it work in
theory?” The third dimension, which relates closely to the second, is the
challenge, when conceptualizing aggression, of moving seamlessly from
the concrete to the abstract and vice versa. This is a perennial challenge in
law with important implications for this project.
This article proceeds as follows. It introduces two methodologies that
are intended to supplement the current negotiation process and thereby help
correct some of the weaknesses that, I argue, have undermined the
substantive definition (Part I). One of the methodologies, scenario
planning, relies upon possible future contingencies to critique the current
draft. These contingencies are presented in Part II. The article proceeds to
unearth and explain the constituent concepts that make up the definition, as
understood by the drafters, and tests them against the proposed
methodologies (Parts III and IV). The proposed methodologies are not
determinate (i.e., more than one outcome is possible), so the product of this
analysis is a critique of the current draft, several suggested forward-looking
modifications, and an approach to defining the crime of aggression that
better accommodates conceptual evolution in a context of rapid social
change. The article closes by evaluating the methodologies and proposing
avenues for further research.
International lawmakers are closer to a negotiated definition today
than at any time since the Nuremberg Charter was penned. The working
group tasked by the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties (ASP) to define the
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crime of aggression has produced a breakthrough draft definition.14 The
final draft article of the Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression (SWGCA), as this group is called, is reproduced in the
Appendix.
I. METHODOLOGIES
The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression built this
definition from international legal precedent and customary international
law, focusing on achieving consensus on the language of the draft. In a
context where legitimacy is gauged by consensus and cooperation, basing
an agreement on past agreements proved to be an effective negotiation
approach, even as it resulted in certain substantive and analytic weaknesses
in the definition. If adopted by the ASP at the ICC’s first review conference
in 2010, the definition will empower the Hague-based court to judge and
punish political and military leaders for planning, preparing, initiating, and
executing illegal wars. An adopted definition, moreover, will permeate
national criminal law as ICC member states implement it, activating a
worldwide network of courts legally bound to hold their own and foreign
leaders to account. Completing the crime of aggression is the primary task
of the 2010 review conference.
A more analytically coherent approach to drafting the crime might
have been to begin from agreed-upon premises and reason through to their
definitional implications. This is the primary way that legal scholars and
philosophers have analyzed the crime of aggression to date. The
philosopher Michael Walzer, author of the seminal 1970s text on just war
theory, begins his analysis of the crime of aggression by asking, “what is
the specific wrong that constitutes aggression?”15 The wrong, Walzer
reasons, is
to force people to fight and die in defense of the state that protects their
common life and the territory on which that common life is lived (it has
to be lived somewhere). It is not just the crossing of the border that

14. The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA) is open to all states on
equal footing, whether or not they have signed and ratified the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, and to a limited number of civil society representatives and legal experts. Mr. Christian
Wenaweser (Liechtenstein) has chaired the group since 2002 but now that Mr. Wenaweser has been
elected president of the Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties as a whole, Prince Ra’ad Zeid AlHussein of Jordan will lead the drafting project. The SWGCA completed its last formal meeting in New
York City on February 13, 2009, but will meet informally in the run-up to the review conference to
consider the elements of the crime and a number of remaining miscellaneous questions. This paper
analyzes the final product of the working group, the basis for the definition of the crime.
15. Michael Walzer, The Crime of Aggressive War, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 635, 635
(2007).
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constitutes the wrong but the threat—to the community and its
members—that the crossing signifies.16

The philosopher Larry May recently crafted an ambitious normative
justification for the crime of aggression, perhaps the most coherent to date.
May, like Walzer, thinks that the mere crossing of a border is not a
sufficient normative grounding for the crime of aggression. He suggests
instead, “crimes of aggression are deserving of international prosecution
when one State undermines the ability of another State to protect human
rights.”17 From this premise, May refutes the traditional understanding of
aggression and, more coherently than any before him, justifies his
alternative. Likewise, Drumbl bases his normative analysis of the crime of
aggression on four interests that the international community hopes to
protect by criminalizing aggression: stability, security, human rights, and
sovereignty.18 Reasoning from these interests, he suggests “an expansion in
the scope of the crime of aggression, both in terms of the impugned acts as
well as in terms of who can be prosecuted.”19 Drumbl’s work, like Walzer’s
and May’s, begins from the normative premises he has selected, but it is
remarkable for its sensitivity to the realities of the drafters. Walzer’s,
May’s, and Drumbl’s projects each offer important insights about the crime
of aggression. Each also requires international lawmakers to agree upon
shared premises in order to devise a coherent definition.
The diplomats participating in the drafting project have shied away
from the prevailing academic approach, represented by these authors,
presumably because they foresee that it will be more difficult to agree upon
an explicit normative basis for the definition than upon the wording of the
definition itself. Instead, they have opted for what the legal scholar Cass
Sunstein calls an “[i]ncompletely [t]heorized [a]greement.”20 According to
Sunstein, “when closure cannot be based on relative abstractions, the legal
system is often able to reach a degree of closure by focusing on relative
particulars.”21 The particulars in the SWGCA discussions are the very
words of the draft, which can be negotiated and traded by delegations
committed to reaching an agreement. Confronted with disagreement on
fundamental principle, Sunstein posits, participants in the law sometimes
seek agreement on a result and a relatively low-level explanation for it:

16. Id.
17. MAY, supra note 10, at 3.
18. Drumbl, supra note 9, at 306.
19. Id. at 294.
20. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1733 (1995).
21. Id. at 1737.
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“When they disagree on an abstraction, they move to a level of greater
particularity.”22 However, even an incompletely theorized agreement has a
normative basis, and the diplomats drafting the definition of the crime of
aggression found theirs, at least explicitly, by looking back to legal
precedent and customary international law. Implicitly, each delegation’s
choice of precedents, and the way that delegation sought to incorporate
them into the draft definition reflected, at least in part, its particular
interests and ideals.
While the backward-looking method employed by the diplomats as
they negotiated the definition of the crime succeeded in bringing the
delegations to the brink of an agreement, it also carried with it a number of
weaknesses, weaknesses that are not unique to these negotiations. These
weaknesses map onto the three previously mentioned dimensions of this
article. The first is that, as a direct consequence of the method chosen by
the diplomats, the definition of the crime of aggression contains
anachronistic concepts that undermine its relevance, and therefore its
legitimacy, today. The broader question here is how law grounded in the
past can best speak to the future. Second, by building the definition from a
hodgepodge of past agreements, the diplomats made analytic and
normative coherence a secondary concern. The method may have
succeeded in practice in building agreement, but is this agreement
defensible as a theory? Third, the method has obscured the political and
strategic interests of states in the language of law, making these interests
more difficult to discern and balance. Finally, the incompletely theorized
draft definition was built from precedent and custom that sometimes risks,
in its generality, violating the principle of legality.23 The tension between
the abstract and the concrete that pervades all lawmaking is particularly
acute in the field of criminal law, where individual liberty is directly at
stake. Meanwhile, as Sunstein demonstrates in Incompletely Theorized
Agreements, the move from the abstract to the particular and vice versa can
be a powerful technique to manage negotiation deadlock and converge
upon an agreement.
My position, in its most general terms, is that the legitimacy of the
definition of a crime can be built—and squandered—in various ways. This
article argues that the definition of the crime of aggression should be

22. Id. at 1736.
23. The definition of a crime must be specific enough to forewarn potential perpetrators of the
distinction between permissible and prohibited behavior. Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute states, in
relevant part, that “[i]n case of ambiguity, the definition [of a crime] shall be interpreted in favour [sic]
of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 22(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 104.
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forward- as well as backward-looking. A backward-looking definition that
fails to regulate important forms of aggression as they emerge is fated to
become irrelevant. A definition that does not fit the sociological
phenomenon it seeks to regulate is, and will be perceived to be, unjust.
These may not seem like controversial claims but, as this article
demonstrates, they have transformative implications for the substantive
definition of the crime of aggression. Traces of a sociologically sensitive
and forward-looking approach are already present in the negotiations and
this article seeks to build upon and systematize them. My solution does not
resolve the tensions between past commitments and future contingencies,
certainty and flexibility, and the possible and the desirable, but it
represents, in my mind, a realistic improvement upon the current approach.
In order to imagine a forward-looking concept of aggression, this
article brings insights from two social science methodologies into the
predominantly doctrinal discussion. These methodological approaches are
scenario planning24 and the grounded theory methodology of Glaser and
Strauss.25 The substantive contribution of this article is to identify outdated
concepts in the emerging definition and to consider incremental
modifications and interpretations that are more sociologically relevant. The
methodological contribution of this article is to begin to flesh out a nascent
approach in international lawmaking that is both forward-looking and
sociologically sensitive based on the amalgamation of these two methods.
A. Scenario Planning
Scenario planning is a set of methods for “improving the quality of
educated guesses” about the future.26 There are many examples of
governments and businesses using scenario planning to help decisionmakers imagine, anticipate, and prepare for a range of possible futures.
Since 1950, the National Intelligence Council of the Central Intelligence
Agency has produced intelligence estimates that set out alternative future
scenarios and are relied upon by United States policy-makers as they plan

24. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE BATTLE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2008) [hereinafter BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT]; PHILIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF
ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY (2002) [hereinafter BOBBITT, SHIELD OF
ACHILLES]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005);
RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE (2004); ROYAL DUTCH SHELL GROUP, THE
SHELL GLOBAL SCENARIOS TO 2025: THE FUTURE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT: TRENDS, TRADE-OFFS
AND CHOICES (2005) [hereinafter SHELL GLOBAL SCENARIOS].
25. BARNY G. GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF GROUNDED THEORY:
STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967).
26. GILL RINGLAND, SCENARIO PLANNING 11 (1998).
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for the future.27 The Royal Dutch Shell Company used scenario planning as
early as the 1970s to anticipate the rapid fluctuations in oil prices brought
on by the formation and actions of OPEC and, in the 1980s, to envisage the
collapse of the Soviet Union.28 The Levi-Strauss clothing company uses a
scenario planning methodology to consider what would happen, for
instance, if cotton no longer existed or the cotton industry was
deregulated.29 The scenario planning methodology can also be a valuable
analytic tool for the SWGCA as it drafts a definition meant to regulate
future wars.
The range of practices that make up the scenario planning
methodology are best described in contrast to a related future studies
methodology: forecasting.30 A scenario can be defined as “an internally
consistent view of what the future might turn out to be”—not a forecast,
but one possible future outcome.31 According to English future studies
scholars George Wright and Paul Goodwin, “[t]he forecaster looks for a
model of reality containing the necessary and sufficient conditions to pin
down the future, the scenario thinker is satisfied to work with only
necessary conditions, and is happy to explore the multiple possibilities
these lead to.”32 Joseph Nye, former head of the United States National
Intelligence Council, describes scenario planning as a tool in estimative
intelligence “[t]o help policymakers interpret the available facts, to suggest
alternative patterns that available facts might fit, [and] to provide informed
assessments of the range and likelihood of possible outcomes.”33
Scenario planners use an array of methods to imagine and refine
possible futures. An example of an influential procedural tool used by
scenario planners is the Delphi technique, developed by the RAND
Corporation in the 1950s, a corporation originally established to research
new weapons technology.34 Researchers employing the Delphi technique
27. See Joseph S. Nye Jr., Peering into the Future, 73 FOREIGN AFF. 82, 83 (1994).
28. See RINGLAND, supra note 26, at 20-21; see also BOBBITT, SHIELD OF ACHILLES, supra note
24, at 718-19.
29. RINGLAND, supra note 26, at 30. For more in depth case studies of how scenario planning has
been used and by whom, see id. at 259.
30. See MICHAEL GODET, CREATING FUTURES: SCENARIO PLANNING AS A STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT TOOL 2 (2d ed. 2006) (“Future studies, or foresight as la prospective is usually
translated, involves anticipation (pre- or pro-activity) to clarify present actions in light of possible or
desirable futures.”).
31. MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING SUPERIOR
PERFORMANCE 446 (1985).
32. Kees van der Heijden, Scenario Planning: Scaffolding Disorganized Ideas About the Future,
in FORECASTING WITH JUDGMENT 39, 50 (George Wright & Paul Goodwin eds., 1998).
33. Nye, supra note 27, at 83.
34. The key innovators were Olaf Helmer, Norman Dalkey, and Nicholas Rescher.
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ask individual experts to answer successive questionnaires about the future
and provide their reasoning. Between rounds of questionnaires, the
researchers summarize the answers and reasons of the experts in a single
document and give the summary back to the experts to consider. The
experts are encouraged to revise their answers between rounds and the
expectation is that they will eventually converge on the best estimates.35
Shell and the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) rely heavily on methods
from the Pierre Wack Intuitive Logics School, which emphasizes the
creation of “a coherent and credible set of stories of the future as a ‘wind
tunnel’ for testing business plans or projects.”36 Scenario planning methods
may be complex or simple.
In this paper, a simple scenario planning method will be used that
draws on the forecasts of experts on war, leadership, and organizations as a
wind tunnel to test the viability of the emerging SWGCA definition of
aggression. War is changing and the SWGCA has not adequately accounted
for this fact. Part II of this paper sets out key trajectories that are likely to
continue into the foreseeable future. A basic grounded theory methodology,
described in the next section, will be employed as a basis for modifying
existing concepts or developing new ones that better fit the range of
possible futures. Application of scenario planning to the field of law will
also be used as a way to test the possibilities and limitations of the scenario
planning method.
B. Grounded Theory
The grounded theory methodology of Barney Glaser and Anselm
Strauss is a response to the logico-deductive method of theory generation in
social research whereby concepts and their relation are devised from a
priori assumptions via armchair speculation.37 Glaser and Strauss felt that
these “armchair” theories did not optimally fit the facts or work. By fit,
they meant, “that the categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to
and indicated by the data under study.”38 By work, they meant that “[the
categories] must be meaningfully relevant to and be able to explain the
behavior under study.”39 Glaser and Strauss charged many “great men”
theories in social research—the theories of Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, and
Marx, among others—with this defect, which they believed had
35. RINGLAND, supra note 26, at 19. See also Gene Rowe & George Wright, The Delphi
Technique as a Forecasting Tool: Issues and Analysis, 15 INT’L J. FORECASTING 351 (1999).
36. RINGLAND, supra note 26, at 27.
37. GLASER & STRAUSS, supra note 25, at viii, 31.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id.
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undermined the field of sociology by turning it into a mere repository of
great men theories with students relegated to technicians testing these
theories in small ways rather than devising their own.40 In order to put the
field of sociology back on track, Glaser and Strauss proposed a method for
generating “grounded theory,” whereby concepts are systematically
generated, tested, and modified from and against new social science data.41
Their approach, created in the 1960s as they studied how nurses care for
dying patients, became one of the most widely used qualitative methods in
social research. The qualitative methods of Glaser and Strauss, in spite of
their internalization in other areas of social research, have not yet
penetrated the field of law.
Strauss and Corbin define theory as “a set of well-developed
categories that are systematically interrelated through statements of
relationship to form a theoretical framework that explains some social
phenomenon.”42 Glaser and Strauss describe the elements of a theory as
“first, conceptual categories and their conceptual properties; and second,
hypotheses or generalized relations among the categories and their
properties.”43 “A category stands by itself as a conceptual element of a
theory. A property, in turn, is a conceptual aspect or element of a
category.”44 The basis of Glaser and Strauss’s grounded theory
methodology is that theory generation is a process and that a theory is “an
ever-developing entity,” never a “perfected product” frozen in time.45 In
this way, grounded theory generation is similar to the common law: both
systems continually test conceptual formulations against new contingencies
and modify these formulations to fit the facts.
The process of grounded theory generation relies on an inductivedeductive loop which Glaser and Strauss call “the constant comparative
method of qualitative analysis.”46 Rather than devising categories,
properties and their relations from a priori assumptions, grounded theory
generation begins from the data related to a research situation—the
treatment of dying patients, social stigma, or the use of military force, for
example. Within the research situation,
40. Id. at 10.
41. Glaser and Strauss devised their method of theory generation from systematically obtained
data in the 1960s while studying how nurses care for dying patients. See generally BARNEY G. GLASER
AND ANSELM L. STRAUSS, AWARENESS OF DYING (1965).
42. ANSELM STRAUSS & JULIET CORBIN, BASICS OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: GROUNDED
THEORY PROCEDURES AND TECHNIQUES 22 (2d ed. 1998).
43. GLASER & STRAUSS, supra note 25, at 35.
44. Id. at 36.
45. Id. at 32.
46. Id. at 101.
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[t]he constant comparing of many groups draws the sociologist’s
attention to their many similarities and differences. Considering these
leads him to generate abstract categories and their properties, which,
since they emerge from the data, will clearly be important to a theory
explaining the kind of behavior under observation.47

These emergent categories are compared with new data and modified
to best explain the behavior under observation. The newly refined
categories serve to guide the theorist’s data collection efforts by
influencing his or her theoretical sampling.48 According to Glaser and
Strauss, “[l]ower level categories emerge rather quickly during the early
phases of data collection,” while “[h]igher level, overriding and integrating,
conceptualizations—and the properties that elaborate them—tend to come
later during the joint collection, coding and analysis of the data.”49 An
important point about grounded theory for the current definitional project is
that new data need not incessantly expand a nascent theory. Rather, new
data refines or changes that theory so that it better fits and works.
The process of regulating human social interactions through law,
lawmaking, is both similar and different from the process of social theory
generation, theorizing. The principal difference between lawmaking and
theorizing is that, while social theorists deal with what is (explanation,
prediction, and control), those regulating social interaction through law
have the added responsibility of incorporating an ought—or prescriptive—
element into their constructs. However, the ought element of a law is only
intelligible in relation to the social theory upon which it rests. This social
theory as an element of a law is assembled from concepts and their
relations, and is intended to reflect reality as authentically as possible—in
the words of Glaser and Strauss, to fit and to work. In particular, a rule
regulating human social interactions, like a social theory, must be
assembled from concepts that fit the facts and relate in a true-to-life way. A
rule that requires individuals or groups to behave in unrealistic ways is
experienced as unjust. Therefore, a legal rule can be thought of as a social
theory—conceptual categories, conceptual properties, and generalized
relations among the categories and their properties—that includes a
prescription. This understanding of the character of rules invites legal
scholars to bring methodological insights from social theorists, such as
Glaser and Strauss, into the field of law.

47. Id. at 36.
48. Id. at 45 (“Theoretical sampling is the process of data collection for generating theory
whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes, and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next
and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges.”).
49. Id. at 36.
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The following parts of this paper test this understanding of rules as
social theories with an ought element by applying aspects of Glaser and
Strauss’s grounded theory methodology to the emerging definition of the
crime of aggression. The focus is the social theory element. In particular,
the grounded theory methodology will be the engine used to generate
conceptual categories, properties, and their relations from new data on the
character of armed conflict under possible futures. It is in this way that
scenario planning and grounded theory methodologies will be applied in
conjunction. Scenario planning will supply the data, and grounded theory
will provide the analytic approach to organize this data. Within the
lawmaking process, the contours of the rule will adhere to the agreement
the negotiators are able to reach on its concepts, properties, and relations.
Beyond generating forward-looking conceptual categories (and properties
and relations) that can serve as constituent elements of the crime of
aggression, this article will begin to evaluate the possibilities and
limitations of the grounded theory approach in the field of law.
Part II identifies key political-military patterns in the armed conflicts
that occurred between 1989 and the present and extrapolates to future
scenarios. In subsequent parts of this article, these scenarios are used, in
conjunction with grounded theory methodology, as a wind tunnel to test
and refine the conceptual categories, properties, and relations of the
SWGCA definition of aggression. This is not, as mentioned before, a
determinate method that generates a fixed outcome. Rather, the following
analysis demonstrates a process designed to bring better clarity than what
currently exists about the kinds of phenomena that the drafters seek to
include in the definition. As I hope to show, the results of this process are
both interesting and novel.
II. FUTURE AGGRESSION SCENARIOS
War is changing. Independent groups other than the state are
increasingly its perpetrators. These groups seem to be moving away from
the bureaucratic organizational form and towards more strategic
organizational arrangements. They are supplementing armed force with
new unarmed methods that are ever more destructive to life and property.
States drafting and voting on the definition of the crime of aggression
should have the opportunity to consider whether to reflect these changes in
the core concepts that make up the definition of the crime. In order to
encourage this discussion, this part sets out and extrapolates from three
emerging scenarios: first, war will become less state-centric and more
decentralized; second, war-making organizations will restructure; and third,
the methods of warfare will change so that they can no longer be justifiably
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limited conceptually to the use of armed force. The following section
constitutes the thick description upon which my suggested modifications to
and interpretations of the draft definition of aggression will be based.50
A. War is becoming less state-centric and more decentralized
In a seminal article in the Marine Corps Gazette, a team of American
analysts led by William S. Lind set out a generational theory that describes
warfare as heading towards an increasingly decentralized form and
resulting in the nation state’s loss of its monopoly on combat forces.51 Lind
and his team, writing as the Soviet Union was collapsing, believed that they
were entering a new generation of warfare, which they called the Fourth
Generation. “A premise of 4GW,” according to a 2007 posting on In
Defense and the National Interest, “is that the world itself has changed, so
that terrorism and guerilla warfare—and other elusive techniques that are
still being invented—are now ready to move to center stage.”52
The heralds of Fourth Generation warfare are not alone in their
forecasts. Military historian Martin van Creveld53 and United States
counterterrorism expert John Robb54 describe the diminishing importance
of conventional war and forecast the future irrelevance of state-on-state
warfare. According to Robb, “Wars between states are now, for all intents
and purposes, obsolete.”55 Robb predicts that “[t]he real threat, as seen in
the rapid rise in global terrorism over the past five years, is that this threat
isn’t another state but rather the superempowered group . . . and as the
leverage provided by technology increases, this threshold will finally reach
its culmination—with the ability of one man to declare war on the world

50. If the suggested methodology were used in the context of a multilateral international
negotiation, the participants would propose scenarios to be regulated and make these an integral part of
their discussion. Scenarios generating widespread support would serve as the initial basis of the
definition. This has already been done, if only occasionally, in the negotiations of the SWGCA.
51. William S. Lind, Colonel Keith Nightengale, Captain John F. Schmitt, Colonel Joseph W.
Sutton, & Lieutenant Colonel Gary I. Wilson, The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,
MARINE CORPS GAZETTE, Oct. 1989, at 22. The first generation was characterized by tactics of line and
column and culminated in the massed-manpower armies of the Napoleonic era. The second generation
used the industrial society to mass-produce firepower and encourage tactics such as indirect fire
covering movement. In the third generation, rather than closing with the enemy, successful commanders
used mechanized forces to bypass and collapse the enemy’s formations (i.e., blitzkrieg). See also
THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY 16-31 (2004).
52. Defense and the National Interest, Is 4GW Simply Using Military Force in New Ways? (Nov.
25, 2007), http://www.d-n-i.net/dni/strategy-and-force-employment/fourth-generation-warfare-articles/.
53. See MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 10-18 (1991).
54. JOHN ROBB, BRAVE NEW WAR: THE NEXT STATE OF TERRORISM AND THE END OF
GLOBALIZATION 7 (2007).
55. Id.
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and win.”56 In 2007, T.X. Hammes, a retired colonel in the United States
Marine Corps, corroborated Robb’s findings: “there have been major
changes in who fights wars. The trend has been and continues to be
downward from nation-states using huge, uniformed armies to small groups
of like-minded people with no formal organization who simply choose to
fight.”57 That same year, a Marine Corps seminar produced a draft doctrinal
manual, in which the authors warned that, “[o]ften, Fourth Generation
opponents’ strategic centers of gravity are intangible.”58 Unlike Robb, who
argues that conventional war is obsolete, the authors of the draft manual
add, “[l]ike always, the old generations of war continue to exist even as
new ones evolve.”59
Philip Bobbitt’s analysis agrees with Robb and the Marine Corps
seminar that war is changing and that “asymmetric warfare will become the
norm when great powers are confronted.”60 However, Bobbitt forecasts that
the state will remain the center of gravity in geopolitics: “[t]he State has
undergone many transformations in the constitutional order—the basis for
the state’s legitimacy—in the ensuing five centuries. Now it is about to
undergo another.”61 Bobbitt asks, “[c]ould al Qaeda be an example of this
new form?”62 Bobbitt’s dynamic conception of the state may offer
diplomats drafting the definition of the crime and jurists interpreting it a
way to include acts by al Qaeda-like groups within its ambit.
Despite their different perspectives on the future of the state, these
forecasters point in a similar direction—most fundamentally, towards the
decentralization of armed conflict—that few experts today dispute.63 If
accurate, the literature on the transformation of war has important
repercussions on the way aggression should be conceptualized and
regulated. Meanwhile, the current methods used by the diplomats as they
negotiate the definition of aggression, which rely on international legal
precedent and customary international law, are incapable of capturing these

56. Id. at 7-8.
57. T.X. Hammes, Fourth Generation Warfare Evolves, Fifth Emerges, MIL. REV., May-June
2007, at 14, 20.
58. Imperial and Royal (K.u. K.) Austro-Hungarian Marine Corps, Fourth Generation War,
FMFM 1-A, Draft 4.2, (June 18, 2007) at 6, http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/3007/fmfm_1a.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Marine Seminar].
59. Id. at 20.
60. BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT, supra note 24, at 146.
61. Id. at 126.
62. Id.
63. But see J. ECHEVARRIA II, STRAT. STUD. INST., FOURTH GENERATION WAR AND OTHER
MYTHS (2005), available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pub
ID=632 (providing a dissenting view).
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changes. Part III of this paper will analyze the concept of the
state/collective act of aggression emerging from the SWGCA and evaluate
it in light of the literature on the transformation of war.
B. War-making organizations are restructuring
Bureaucracy is increasingly limited as an organizational model for
strategic warfare. This shift away from bureaucracy is predominantly a
reaction to three problems faced by this organizational form: wasted
intelligence, failure to control the formal-informal split within the
organization, and the inability to adapt efficiently when organizational
change is required.64 In the context of modern warfare, bureaucracies
present two additional problems. First, they are an easy target. It is less
complex to attack a government, which has permanent institutions and
infrastructure, than the hundreds of mercurial cells that make up al Qaeda.
Second, though bureaucracies are effective at coordinating massive uses of
force, they are not particularly resilient as an organizational form.
Specialization of function increases productive output, but it also makes the
entire system vulnerable when a single part is disabled. In response to these
weaknesses, war-making organizations are restructuring.
Rutgers management professor Charles Heckscher forecasts that
organizations in general are undergoing a long-term shift that amounts to
an evolutionary development beyond bureaucracy.65 Heckscher and
Donnellon et al. describe a pattern of empirical developments that
characterize the “post-bureaucratic” organization,66 including increased
member participation in decision-making, cross-functional teams breaking
the walls of functional organizations, parallel organizations operating on
the basis of multi-level consensus, information technology facilitating
dense networks of communication, organizational development practices
building the decision-making capacity of peer groups, opening of
previously closed inter-organizational boundaries, sharing of information

64. Charles Heckscher, Defining the Post-Bureaucratic Type, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC
ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 14, 20-24 (Charles Heckscher &
Anne Donnellon eds., 1994).
65. Id. at 14.
66. “[A]n organic form of organization . . . [is] more team-based, more flexible, and less rulebound than the traditional ‘mechanical’ hierarchy.” Charles Heckscher & Lynda M. Applegate,
Introduction, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL
CHANGE 2 (Charles Heckscher & Anne Donnellon eds. 1994). See also 12 Manage, Adjusting
Organization Forms to Appropriate Conditions: Explanation of Theory of Organic and Mechanistic
Organizations of Burns and Stalker, http://www.12manage.com/methods_burns_mechanistic_
organic_systems.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2009) (comparing the post-bureaucratic and the organic
organizational forms).
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previously reserved for top officials, negotiated over top-down solutions,
and new roles such as task force leader, change agent, coordinator,
boundary-basher.67 A key characteristic of this shift is that the “postbureaucratic organization” relies on the use of influence rather than
power.68 “The influence hierarchy is not embedded in permanent offices,”
observes Heckscher, “and is to a far greater degree than bureaucracy based
on the consent of and the perceptions of other members of the
organization.”69 The central role of influence rather than formal authority in
post-bureaucratic organizations has important implications for the
definition of the crime of aggression that will be set out in Part IV of this
paper.
These post-bureaucratic developments correspond to a change in the
concept of leadership so that formal position and effective control over the
action of subordinates, the key criteria in international criminal law, are no
longer the most relevant properties of the category. What is becoming
increasingly relevant to the concept of leadership is, rather, an individual’s
centrality within a social network and his or her influence upon that
network or group. According to Professors Daniel Brass and Marlene
Burkhardt, specialists in organizational behavior, “a common finding in
social network studies is that central positions are often associated with
power and influence.”70 Centrality is most often defined in terms of degree
(“the number of direct ties one has with others”),71 betweenness (“falls on
the shortest path between pairs of other points”),72 and closeness
(“distances among points”)73 within a social network. Influence, according
to Professor Joseph Nye, rests on the combination of hard power (carrots
and sticks) and soft power (attraction and cooption).74 This article will

67. Charles Heckscher & Lynda M. Applegate, Introduction, in THE POST-BUREAUCRATIC
ORGANIZATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 2-3 (Charles Heckscher & Anne
Donnellon eds. 1994).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Daniel J. Brass & Marlene E. Burkhardt, Centrality and Power in Organizations, in
NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS 191, 191 (Nitin Nohria & Robert G. Eccles eds., 1992).
71. Michael D. Irwing & Holly L. Hughes, Centrality and the Structure of the Urban Interaction:
Measures, Concepts, and Applications, 71 SOC. FORCES 17, 19 (1992).
72. Linton C. Freeman, A Set of Measures of Centrality Based on Betweenness, 40 SOCIOMETRY
35, 35 (1977) (citing Alex Bavelas, A Mathematical Model for Group Structure, 7 APPLIED
ANTHROPOLOGY 16, 16 (1948)).
73. Id.
74. JOSEPH S. NYE JR., THE POWERS TO LEAD 31 (2008) (“Soft power is not merely the same as
influence, though it is one source of influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of
threats or payments. Nor is soft power just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument,
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consider whether the SWGCA definition of aggression can reach beyond
formal authority to capture both aspects of influence, which have been
operationalized in numerous studies and would not be difficult to employ
for the purpose of criminal law by the ASP or the Court.75
C. The methods of warfare are changing
The use of armed force may still be the primary method of warfare,
but this is changing. Invasion, bombardment, blockade, and the sending or
directing of proxy forces into an enemy state are the methods of warfare
that form the basis of the SWGCA concept of aggression. These traditional
methods are increasingly being supplemented by a cluster of destructive
methods, called “systems disruption,” that do not rely on arms.76
John Robb, the former United States counterterrorism operation
planner and commander who coined the term, describes systems disruption
as the sabotage of critical systems such as electricity, telecommunications,
gas, water, or transport, to inflict economic costs on a target state.77 Though
sabotage is an ancient form of warfare, Robb predicts that it will soon take
center stage because of our increased reliance on interdependent
networks.78 By targeting a vulnerable point in a network and disrupting it
by whatever means, armed or unarmed, an aggressor can collapse a system,
“amplif[ying] the damage of the attack and providing rates of return up to a
million times the initial investment (the cost of the attack)”:79
In the summer of 2004, Iraq’s global guerillas attacked a southern
section of the Iraqi oil pipeline infrastructure (Iraq has over 4300 miles
of pipelines). This attack cost the attackers an estimated $2000 to
produce. None of the attackers was caught. The effects of this attack
were over $500 million in lost oil exports.80

Systems disruption makes warfare affordable to small groups and even
individuals intelligent enough to find a system’s unique vulnerabilities and
create a cascade of failure.81 Robb gives numerous examples of massively
damaging systems disruption attacks of which the 2006 attacks on two

though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to entice and attract. Attraction often leads to
acquiescence.”).
75. Linton C. Freeman, Centrality in Social Networks: Conceptual Clarification, 1 SOC.
NETWORKS 215 (1979).
76. ROBB, supra note 54, at 95.
77. Id. at 95.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 98.
80. Id. at 99.
81. Id. at 100.
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Russian Gazprom pipelines carrying natural gas to Georgia is one.82 In the
midst of harshly cold weather, Gazprom’s primary and backup pipelines
were destroyed at the same time as a power transmission pylon carrying
electricity from Russia to Georgia. The attacks reduced Georgia to a
“preindustrial level” for a week.83 Two features of systems disruption
attacks are particularly important for drafters and interpreters of the crime
of aggression to take into account: first, the low cost and high return of
these attacks allows individuals and small groups other than the state to
wage war; second, these attacks need not be carried out with armaments.
Cyberwarfare, a method still in its infancy, seems poised to become an
important method for aggressive states, small groups, and individuals to
disrupt an enemy’s essential infrastructure (or services) and cause massive
damage. Essential infrastructure and services such as air traffic control,
medical files, and defense systems increasingly rely on networks to operate
and are vulnerable to attack from inside or out. To date, documented
cyberattacks have amounted to a growing nuisance rather than causing
significant damage to infrastructure,84 but recent attacks hint at vastly
destructive future scenarios. Volunteer groups tracking malicious activity
on the internet documented attacks against Georgia as early as July 20,
2008, weeks before the Georgian assault on Tskhinvali or the Russian
invasion.85 Government, media, communications and transportations
companies were attacked. The website of Georgian president Mikheil
Saakashvili was overwhelmed by a “denial of service attack” whereby a
barrage of millions of bogus requests overloaded and shut it down. 86 The
web sites of the Georgian parliament and the National Bank of Georgia
were defaced by images of twentieth century dictators interspersed with
images of President Saakashvili. The attacks in Georgia targeted websites,
but, in 2007, cyberattacks in Estonia briefly interrupted communication
with Emergency services.87 Hackers who disrupt government web sites
today may disrupt or mimic government and military electronic
communications tomorrow, turning institutions and infrastructure against
an enemy at low cost and with minimal risk to their own safety. If
cyberwarfare is wedded to advanced notions of systems disruption, the next
82. Id. at 94-95.
83. Id.
84. Ethan Zuckerman, Misunderstanding Cyberwar in Georgia, REUTERS, Aug. 16, 2008, http://
www.reuters.com/article/reutersEdge/idUSGOR66065320080816.
85. John Markoff, Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2008, at A1, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html.
86. Id.
87. Marching off to Cyberwar, ECONOMIST TECHNOLOGY QUARTERLY, Dec. 6, 2008, at 13,
available at http://www.economist.com/sciencetechnology/tq/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12673385.

COPY OF WEISBORD_FMT3.NOV18.DOC

20

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

11/20/2009 12:53:44 PM

[Vol 20:1

oil pipeline, electricity grid, or nuclear reactor to be sabotaged may be
struck by a hacker, not a bomb.
A key aspect of cyberwar for the concept of aggression is the
disaggregated quality of the attacks. In April 2001, a United States Navy
spy plane collided with a Chinese jet fighter over the South China Sea,
killed the fighter’s pilot, and was forced to land on China’s Hainan Island.
After a diplomatic row, the plane and crew were returned safely to the
United States. Following the incident, un-attributable web sites sprang up
offering instructions to hackers on how to disable United States
government computers.88 According to United States officials, the attacks
nearly shut down California’s electrical grid.89 To this day, nobody knows
whether the attacks were state-sponsored or grass-roots activism.90 As
private companies such as the Russian Business Network91 disseminate
more malicious software capable of turning private computers from
Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe into unknowing bases from which cyberattacks
can be waged, the source of the ensuing attacks will become still more
murky and responsibility maddeningly difficult to attribute to a state. In
this context, bureaucracy, the paradigmatic organizational model imagined
by the drafters of the crime of aggression as they designed the legal
mechanism whereby responsibility will be attributed to an individual, is
less relevant.
The following parts of this article will test the constituent concepts of
the SWGCA definition of the crime of aggression against these scenarios—
war is becoming less state-centric, war-making organizations are
reorganizing, the methods of warfare are changing—and suggest forwardlooking modifications and interpretations. My intention is to shift the
discussion to future contingencies. The constituent parts of the definition of
the crime of aggression, as understood by the drafters, structure the
analysis. They are the state/collective act of aggression and the conceptual
link through which an individual is held accountable for that
state/collective act.92

88. Michael Reilly, How Long Before All-out Cyberwar?, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 23, 2008, at 24.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Markoff, supra note 85.
92. The jurisdictional trigger that allows the ICC or a member state to initiate an aggression case
is part of the SWGCA negotiations. E.g., ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, 6th Sess., New York, June 6, 2008, Report of the Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, Annex II, 6-8, ICC-ASP/6/20/Add.1, available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-6-20-Add1-AnnexII-ENG.pdf.; Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court, New York, July 25, 2002, Report of the Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court: Addendum Part II: Proposals for a Provision on the Crime of
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III. CONCEPTUALIZING THE STATE/COLLECTIVE ACT OF
AGGRESSION
The SWGCA has proposed a historic solution to the ancient problem
of how to distinguish just from unjust wars.93 The solution was negotiated
in the context of a Cold War era General Assembly Resolution (3314)
called “Definition of Aggression,” a resolution that delegates have chosen,
because of its precedential value, to use as the basis for the state/collective
component of the definition of the crime.94 The SWGCA selected articles
from the 1974 Definition, which pertains to states, and incorporated them
into the definition of the crime of aggression, which pertains to individuals.
The incorporated articles from the 1974 Definition are now part of the draft
definition of the crime of aggression, known in the SWGCA as the State
Act of Aggression or simply the State Act.
As a result of the SWGCA’s drafting method, fundamental sub-issues
within the ancient debate over just and unjust wars such as the subject of
the prohibition, the distinction between aggression and self-defense, and
the acts that qualify as aggression are all subsumed in the formal legal
debate over the correct way to incorporate this 1974 resolution into the
larger crime. In order to understand the concept of aggression that
materializes when parts of that definition are incorporated into the draft
definition of the crime of aggression and others are left out, it is therefore
necessary to understand the provisions of the 1974 Definition and their
relationship to each other. Part III undertakes this analysis and tests the
resulting concept of aggression that the SWGCA has employed in the

Aggression, 3-4, PCNICC/2002/2/ADD.2, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
pcnicc2002_2e.pdf. The jurisdictional trigger is not, however, considered a part of the definition of the
crime of aggression.
93. For examples of this literature, see MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL
ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1977); JAMES TURNER JOHNSON, JUST WAR
TRADITION AND THE RESTRAINT OF WAR: A MORAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY (1981); JAMES TURNER
JOHNSON, THE HOLY WAR IDEA IN WESTERN AND ISLAMIC TRADITIONS (1997); JAMES TURNER
JOHNSON, MORALITY & CONTEMPORARY WARFARE (1999); TERRY NARDIN ET AL., TRADITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS (Terry Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992); James F. Childress, Just-War
Theories: The Bases, Interrelations, Priorities, and Functions of Their Criteria, 39 THEOLOGICAL
STUDIES 427 (1978); James F. Childress, Moral Discourses About War in the Early Church, in PEACE,
POLITICS AND THE PEOPLE OF GOD 117-34 (Paul Peachy ed., 1986); Sohail H. Hashmi, Interpreting the
Islamic Ethic of War and Peace, in THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR
PERSPECTIVES 146-68 (Terry Nardin ed., 1996); MOHAMMAD TAGHI KAROUBI, JUST OR UNJUST WAR?
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNILATERAL USE OF ARMED FORCE BY STATES AT THE TURN OF THE 20TH
CENTURY (2004).
94. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), at 142, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974) [hereinafter 1974
Resolution]. The term state/collective is used throughout this article to indicate that the collective
responsible for an act of aggression need not be a state.
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definition of the crime against the future aggression scenarios set out in
Part II.
It turns out that the 1974 Definition, as it has been incorporated into
the draft definition of the crime, is riddled with anachronistic concepts that
undermine its normative relevance today. This is not surprising. The 1974
Definition is a product of Cold War ideas and politics. The armed conflicts
at the time of the negotiations—between 1950 and 1974—shaped the
discussions of the delegates and the concept of aggression that emerged.
The delegates attempted to regulate the dominant forms of armed conflict
occurring around them, as well as to ensure that the definition advanced
their key political-strategic interests. Interestingly, the scenario planning
method was more apparent in these Cold War-era negotiations than it is in
the current drafting project. During the Cold War, the competing blocs
quite explicitly sought to forecast how each proposal might, under possible
futures, impact their political and strategic interests.
Three characteristics of the armed conflicts of the day shaped the 1974
Definition: the political-strategic competition between the Soviet Union
and the West for global supremacy; the forms of armed conflict that the
delegates sought to regulate, specifically, nuclear war, conventional war for
territory, and state-sponsored insurgency; and struggles of peoples for
independence from colonial regimes. The negotiations became a Cold War
battlefield with words as weapons, arguments as tactics, and the definition
of aggression a strategic asset that states vied to control with the aim of one
day mobilizing it against their geopolitical rivals. The dominant forms of
armed conflict today and in the foreseeable future, however, are different
now than they were in 1974, as are the strategic interests shaping the
definition of the crime of aggression.
Furthermore, the negotiating positions of delegates and the positions
of legal scholars commenting on the definition, such as Benjamin Ferencz
and Julius Stone, were conditioned by their understanding of the
possibilities and limitations of law, and international law in particular.
Specifically, the negotiations over the Definition of Aggression were taking
place as the field of international law was undergoing an historic
transformation.95 According to Harvard Law Professor David Kennedy,
“[a]ll of pre-war international law was in disrepute after 1945. The
positivists in the United States had been largely isolationist, and the
naturalist enthusiasts for the League seemed to have been altogether out of

95. David Kennedy, When Renewal Repeats: Thinking Against the Box, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 335, 380 (2000).
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touch . . . .”96 The new disciplinary consensus, which was to last until the
end of the Cold War, “rejected both naturalism and positivism in favor of a
general sensibility influenced by pragmatism, functionalism, American
legal realism, and the American legal process school.”97 Just as the postWorld War II political landscape shaped the 1974 Definition of
Aggression, the post-World War II intellectual sensibility left its mark.
This conceptual analysis of the state/collective act of aggression as a
component of the crime of aggression will focus on four key properties
(also the sub-Parts of Part III): A) the unit to be regulated; B) the primary
feature distinguishing aggression and self-defense; C) the acts that qualify
as aggression; and D) the Escheresque property of the 1974 Definition, lost
in the definition of the crime of aggression. It is this final characteristic of
the 1974 Definition, its Escheresque property, that makes any modification
of it for the purpose of incorporating it into the definition of the crime of
aggression so delicate.
In particular, as the 1974 Definition was being negotiated,
discrepancies between American and Soviet concepts of aggression were
managed using a drafting technique that can be characterized as
Escheresque because of its analogy to the trompe-l’oeil sketches of the
Dutch artist M.C. Escher. Just as removing one element from an Escher
sketch can fundamentally change its character, removing articles from the
1974 Definition fundamentally alter the concept of aggression. This is why
each sub-Part of the following analysis begins by tracing how the SWGCA
incorporation of the 1974 Definition into the definition of the crime of
aggression has changed its underlying properties and their relations. The
sub-Parts then evaluate the conceptual product against the scenarios set out
in Part II and suggest incremental modifications and/or interpretations that
make the SWGCA’s state/collective act of aggression, as a component of
the draft crime of aggression, more closely tailored to foreseeable acts of
aggression poised to emerge.
A. The Unit to Be Regulated
1. Summary of the Argument
The SWGCA has designed a crime that analogizes the state to a
weapon wielded by a statesman against another state. The definition of the
crime of aggression is more state-centric, in fact, than its parent 1974
Definition, as this sub-part will explain. Today and in the foreseeable

96. Id. at 379.
97. Id. at 380.
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future, however, as Part II forecasts, there are and will be weapons other
than the state (as currently conceived) and aggressors besides the statesman
that the definition of the crime of aggression fails to capture. This sub-Part
argues that the definition of the crime of aggression should be modified
and/or interpreted to include them, or risk irrelevance.
2. The 1974 Definition Prior to its Incorporation into the Crime of
Aggression
The unit to be regulated in the draft definition of the crime of
aggression is fashioned from the 1974 Definition, though it is, in fact, quite
different conceptually. The preamble of the 1974 Resolution recalls “the
duty of States under the Charter to settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in order not to endanger international peace, security and
justice,” and reaffirms “that the territory of a State shall not be violated by
being the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other
measures of force.” Article 1, which begins like the preamble and many of
the articles that follow (i.e., Arts. 3, 6, 7, 8), identifies the fundamental
geopolitical unit as the state rather than some alternative such as an
individual statesman, the leader of a group, or a people. Thomas and
Thomas, legal scholars commenting on the negotiations in the run-up to the
1974 Definition, explain that, “[s]ince the state has been the prime recipient
of rights and duties at international law, it is the sovereign state which is
usually regarded as the aggressor or the one against whom aggression is
committed.”98 The explanatory note to Article 1 does not rule out the
application of the definition to a group of states such as, presumably, a
coalition, a treaty organization, or a union. The concept that comes into
view throughout the definition is of states penetrating the territory of other
states and undermining their political independence.
This is not the whole story. The Escheresque quality of the 1974
Definition is revealed when considering whether the state is the only
political unit subject to the definition. According to Ferencz, the debate as
to whether the only entities regulated should be states continued until at
least 1971.99 Cassin, Debevoise, Kailes, and Thompson, writing at the time,
identify the indeterminacy created by the explanatory note attached to
Article 1: if the word State is used “without prejudice to questions of
recognition,” there is no indication whether the de facto or the de jure

98. ANN V.W. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW 47 (1972).
99. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It’s Going, 66 AM. J.
INT’L L. 491, 498 (1972) [hereinafter Ferencz, 1972].
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government is regulated by the definition.100 The upshot is that a violent
insurgent group operating from the bush and claiming to be the legitimate
government of a state can argue that it is acting in self-defense to expel a
foreign occupier from the capital. Meanwhile, the group in power in the
capital can claim it is defending against an (externally supported)
insurgency. Article 1 does not resolve the question of which use of force is
legitimate and which is not.
Furthermore, two other political units besides the state are
contemplated in the 1974 Definition: “armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries,” that, at the behest of a state, “carry out acts of armed force
against another state,”101 and peoples under alien domination forcibly
deprived of their right to self-determination.102 Under Article 3(g), armed
bands are analogized to a weapon penetrating an enemy state, devoid of
volition or responsibility under international law, whose actions are
attributable to the state that sent them. Article 7, which reads like an
aside—”Nothing in this Definition . . . could in any way prejudice the right
to self-determination”—seems, at first glance, to have the objective of
guaranteeing a preexisting right of peoples to struggle against colonial or
racist regimes to establish their own state.
Read together, however, Articles 3(g) and 7 create the trompe-l’oeil
necessary to achieve consensus between American and Soviet blocs on the
1974 Definition as a whole.103 According to Cassin, Debevoise, Kailes, and
Thompson, “opinions on self-determination aided by external force divide
along political and ideological lines. China, the Soviet Union, and some
Third World nations vigorously support the use of force to achieve selfdetermination. The United States, Japan, and the European Community
abhor the prospect.”104 Julius Stone wrote disapprovingly of the Soviet
Union and China, who, he felt, “tried to secure the best of both worlds”:
while the Soviet Union tried to stress that only struggles against “colonial”
or “racist” oppressors were covered by Article 7, China sought to limit

100. Vernon Cassin, Whitney Debevoise, Howard Kailes & Terence W. Thompson, The Definition
of Aggression, 16 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 589, 595 (1975).
101. 1974 Resolution, supra note 94, art. 3(g).
102. Id. art. 7.
103. See generally Benjamin B. Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression:
Sieve or Substance, 10 J. INT’L L. & ECON. 701, 709-17 (1975) (describing and analyzing the
compromise nature of the definition of aggression) [hereinafter Ferencz, 1975]; Benjamin B. Ferencz, A
Proposed Definition of Aggression: By Compromise and Consensus, 22 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 407
(1973) (analyzing the compromise definition that emerged from the negotiations between the competing
blocs); Ferencz, 1972, supra note 99, at 496-501 (providing an extensive discussion of the points of
contention between the competing blocs).
104. Cassin et al., supra note 101, at 599-600.
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Article 7 to “imperialist” oppression, which Beijing associated with both
the United States and the Soviet Union.105 The negotiated outcome is not
radical indeterminacy, but rather, as the next paragraph explains, a legal
trompe-l’oeil that covers the range of armed conflicts of the day and
fluctuates, depending upon how the articles are read, between permitting
and prohibiting the use of force by armed groups. Here is how the trompel’oeil works.
Article 3(g), read on its own, prohibits the sending of armed groups to
carry out attacks against a State that amount to aggression. Article 7
safeguards the right of “peoples” to “struggle” for self-determination and to
“seek and receive support.” Read together, the two provisions meld the
stigmatization of the use of armed force by non-state groups and the
principle of self-determination of peoples without appearing to directly
contradict each other. The essential element that allows the trompe-l’oeil to
succeed is the innocuous-seeming qualifier that permits “struggles” for
self-determination “in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in
conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration [the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation among States].” The Six Powers, led by the United States,
could interpret the Charter and the Declaration, and therefore the qualifier,
as prohibiting the use of force by struggling armed groups, while the
thirteen (non-aligned) Powers could interpret it as authorizing armed
struggle for self-determination. Stone notes, “[t]he final result was to
preserve the above preconsensual conflicts as a question of interpretation
whether the right of peoples to ‘struggle’ includes the right to use armed
force against the parent state and the corresponding question as to the right
of third states to support such struggles by force.”106 Ultimately, the
unresolved question of whether the State is the only subject of the
definition or whether “peoples” are also contemplated and captured by the
Resolution was built into its provisions. This intricate Cold War-era
concept of aggression was completely altered by the SWGCA when it
incorporated it into the definition of the crime of aggression. The way the
1974 Definition was incorporated changed the relations between its
properties. Rather than making the concept of aggression more relevant, the
SWGCA made it less.

105. Julius Stone, Hopes and Loopholes in the 1974 Definition of Aggression, 71 AM. J. INT’L L.
224, 234 (1977) [hereinafter Stone, 1977].
106. Id. at 233.
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3. The 2009 SWGCA Concept of the State/Collective Act of
Aggression
The SWGCA, in its final report, has included Articles 1 and 3 of the
1974 Definition into the crime of aggression as the State act. Read alone,
Articles 1 and 3 eradicate the Escher effect and the Cold War duality that
characterizes the original text. As a result of the way the 1974 definition is
incorporated into the draft crime of aggression, the draft crime fails to
capture independent non-state groups without a state sponsor. Independent
non-state groups are those that scenario forecasters have identified as the
most important emerging threat to global security. The following explains
how incorporating Articles 1 and 3 of the 1974 Definition without the rest
has changed the concept of aggression.
The idea of states launching armed attacks against states which, in the
integrated 1974 Definition, is transformed by Article 7, and which
refocuses the definition on “peoples” and their right to “struggle” for selfdetermination, becomes even more state-centric when Article 7 is removed.
Though the existence of armed non-state groups is acknowledged in Article
3(g), non-state groups are represented exclusively as a weapon used by one
state against another. While the 1974 Definition was capable of two
interpretations in this regard, the definition of the crime of aggression is
not. The state is a weapon in the hand of a statesman.
This fixation on the state is particularly troubling in light of the
literature on the transformation of war, which forecasts increasing
decentralization, the state’s continued loss of its monopoly on combat
forces, the diminishing importance of conventional war, the rise of
superempowered groups and individuals, and intangible strategic centers of
gravity. The reality is that states now face a common threat from
independently acting transnational guerillas that, we are seeing, are able to
convince populations of the legitimacy of their violence. Governments
wishing to consolidate power in this context have an impetus to band
together and prevent the erosion of their monopoly on the use of legitimate
violence by reinforcing the existing war convention and criminalizing
aggression by non-state groups and, eventually, superempowered
individuals. International criminal law, which penetrates the state, is a
sensible place to intervene. This would also ensure the relevance of the
definition of the crime of aggression as times change.
4. Suggested Modifications and/or Interpretations
These sociological changes in the character of modern war should be
used as a basis to modify or interpret the concept of the state/collective act.
This can be done in one of three ways: by incrementally modifying the
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draft definition of the crime of aggression; by interpreting it in light of the
1974 Definition as a whole; or by interpreting the concept of the state
dynamically, as Philip Bobbitt has done in his socio-legal scholarship.107
In order to include non-state groups within the definition of the crime
of aggression, the word “State” should be accompanied by “or Group,” or
“/Group,” each time it is used to refer to the aggressor. For instance, Article
8 bis, paragraph 1 of the definition, “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime
of aggression’ means the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a
person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political or military action of a State” should instead read, “For the purpose
of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation,
initiation, or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State or Group”
or, “For the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime of aggression’ means the
planning, preparation, initiation, or execution, by a person in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State/Group.”108 If the States Parties voting on the provision at
the 2010 review conference or at a subsequent opportunity prefer to qualify
the word “Group” for the sake of specificity, they can do so by adding the
words “Political” or “Military” before it. Both words are consistent with
the quality of aggression that scenario planners expect to emerge.
Furthermore, the Rome Statute already explicitly contemplates
organizations and groups in the provisions on crimes against humanity109

107. See generally BOBBITT, SHIELD OF ACHILLES, supra note 24, at 6 (“[T]here is no state without
strategy, law, and history . . . . The precise nature of this composition defines a particular state . . . .
[E]very state is some combination of these elements and can be contrasted with every other state . . . in
these ways.”); BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT, supra note 24, at 4 (noting that there is a “change in
the constitutional order—from nation state to market state,” and defining the market state as “[t]he
emerging constitutional order that promises to maximize the opportunity of its people . . . . It is
contrasted with the current nation state, the dominant constitutional order of the twentieth century that
based its legitimacy on a promise to improve the material welfare of its people”). Mark Drumbl arrives
at a similar conclusion as I do from his initial normative premises: “If we are agreed as to the interests
at play, then the question follows whether criminalizing only interstate armed attacks that flagrantly
violate the jus ad bellum captures the key stability, security, human rights, and sovereignty challenges
that the international community currently faces. I think that the answer to this question is ‘no.’”
Drumbl, supra note 9, at 306.
108. Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 7th Sess. (second
resumption), N.Y., Feb. 9-13, 2009, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/CRP.2, Annex I, Proposals for a provision on
aggression elaborated by the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, at 11 (on file with the
author).
109. “‘Attack directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct . . . pursuant to or
in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court art. 7(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 104.
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and war crimes.110 Modifying the draft definition has the advantage of
certainty over interpreting it in one of the two ways described next.
Delegates, however, are understandably reticent to reopen the definition to
debate lest it undermine the agreements that have already been reached
after years of negotiations.
The first interpretation that would include armed groups acting
independently of the state requires the definition of the crime of aggression
to be read in light of the 1974 Definition as a whole. This interpretation is
natural in light of the language of Paragraph 2 of the draft definition of the
crime of aggression, which reads, in relevant part:
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:
[the list of acts from Article 3 of the 1974 Definition follows]

The reason this reading fits naturally is that the SWGCA discussion
about whether to include the definition in whole or in part was never
completely resolved. While Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi’s 2002
Discussion Paper refers to GA Resolution 3314 in its entirety—Article 2:
“act of aggression” means an act referred to in United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 3314111—Christian Wenaweser’s 2007 drafts add two
“disaggregated” models to the discussion, both of which include only
Articles 1 and 3 of the 1974 Definition. The final report of the SWGCA, in
spite of residual resistance from a number of states, settles on the
disaggregated model that incorporates Articles 1 and 3 of the 1974
Definition directly into the definition of the crime of aggression. The more
sophisticated among the resisting states agreed to the direct incorporation
of Articles 1 and 3 because of the phrase, “in accordance with United
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.”
This phrase is the channel through which aspects of the General
Assembly’s Cold War-era concept of aggression can be read into the
definition of the crime of aggression, for instance, the inclusion of nonstate groups. The weaknesses of this approach as a technique for including
non-state groups within the ambit of the definition of the crime is that, as
this sub-Part explains above, Articles 3(g) and 7 of the 1974 Definition,
read together and in the context of the other provisions, are far from
110. “[A]rmed conflicts not of an international character . . . applies to . . . armed conflict between
governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.” Id. art. 8(2)(f).
111. Preparatory Commiss’n for the Int’l Criminal Court, Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression,
Discussion
paper
proposed
by
the
Coordinator,
U.N.
Doc.
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.2 (July 11, 2002), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/documents/
aggression/
aggressiondocs.htm
(follow
link
to
English
pdf
document
of
PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.2 [hereinafter 2002 Discussion Paper].
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determinate. This is in large part due to the Escher effect built into the 1974
Definition. Furthermore, limiting the definition to States and peoples
struggling for self-determination is still anachronistic in light of the variety
of aggressive groups scenario forecasters have imagined. The strength of
this approach, meanwhile, is that it does not require the review conference
to reopen the draft definition to scrutiny, potentially rekindling old
controversies and stalling the amendment process at the eleventh hour.
The final, and I think the best, approach, despite the fact that it may at
first seem counterintuitive to some jurists, is to read the word “State”
dynamically and incrementally to include state-like entities. This common
law approach to the challenge of social change preserves the conceptual
character of the original norm while allowing it to adapt. In fact, the
properties of the state have never been stagnant. Philip Bobbitt, in The
Shield of Achilles and Terror and Consent, explains how the modern state
has transformed over time, describes its various forms, and forecasts how it
will continue to evolve. The definition of the crime of aggression should be
adaptable enough to capture conceptual evolution lest it become
irrelevant.112 Eventually, new political-military organizations that do not
control territory but that attack states should be included within the ambit
of the definition. Whether the definition will one day include acts of
aggression against these organizations is an open question that national and
international judges hearing aggression cases should resolve on a case-bycase basis. The strength of this approach is that it does not reopen the draft
definition to scrutiny at the review conference. The weakness is that judges
interpreting the definition may be accused of judicial activism and the
authority of their decisions challenged.
The main policy argument for modifying or interpreting the definition
in this way is that it broadens the definition beyond recognition. There are
legitimate concerns that an overly broad definition may dilute its pull to
compliance or invite the ICC and national prosecutors to exercise too much
discretion in his or her enforcement of the law. In fact, when the other
aspects of the definition are taken into account, such as the de minimis
clause specifying that the attack must amount to a manifest violation of the
UN Charter and that it must be perpetrated by the political or military
leaders of a group, the nature of that aggressive group becomes less
relevant. Had the definition been law at the time of the 9/11 attacks, the
suggested modification would have included Osama bin Laden within their
112. The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, that sets out the
qualifications for statehood and which are taken by some jurists to preclude a dynamic and incremental
interpretation of statehood, was not drafted for the purpose of international criminal law, and should
serve as a guide for judicial interpretation, not binding authority.
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ambit, while the current draft would not because al Qaeda is not a state.
This is an important scenario and the diplomats should be encouraged in
their negotiations to consider whether and how it might shape the core
concepts, properties, and relations of their definition. The current drafting
methods, however, do not invite discussions of this type.
B. Distinguishing Aggression and Self-Defense
1. Summary of the Argument
The SWGCA has devised a procedural solution to the intractable
problem of distinguishing aggression and self-defense. They have
delegated responsibility for the determination to judges applying the
provisions of the Rome Statute and the rules of customary international
law. This is an historic advance because it marks a shift from politics to law
in the use of force regime. In their interpretations, tribunals should be
guided by three considerations: a just interpretation should admit no double
standard; any rule should include widely accepted institutional checks and
balances; and, the rule should not be a suicide pact.
2. The 1974 Definition Prior to its Incorporation into the Crime of
Aggression
Article 2 makes first strike prima facie evidence of aggression.
However, the simple determinacy of Article 2 is another trompe-l’oeil. In
fact, Article 2 is one of the more stark examples of the Escher effect
deliberately built into the 1974 definition of aggression in order to
overcome the negotiation deadlock caused by Cold War polarities. The
seemingly paradoxical nature of the provision is the result of an allinclusive compromise reached between Soviet and Western blocks on the
relevance of first strike versus intention (also referred to as “purpose” in
the negotiations) as properties of the concept of aggression.
At the League of Nations Conference for the Reduction and
Limitation of Armaments in 1933, the Foreign Commissar of the Soviet
Union, Maxim Maximovitch Litvinov, argued that prohibiting first strike
would be the most effective deterrent to potential aggressors and submitted
a draft definition based on this idea.113 The prohibition on first strike, also
known as the “principle of priority,”114 was criticized by the United States
and its allies who argued that 1) it is difficult to determine who had struck
first; 2) historically, the first use of armed force was often provoked as a
113. Minutes of the Gen. Commiss’n, Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation
of Armaments, Vol.II, 237-38 (September, 1933), available at http://www.letton.ch/lvx_33sdn.htm.
114. Cassin et al., supra note 100, at 596.
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pretext for a massive retaliation; and 3) in the context of weapons of mass
destruction, it would be too late to defend once the first strike had
occurred.115 Between 1933 and 1974, the United States and its allies
repeatedly put forth and stuck to their counterproposal that the intent or
purpose of the belligerents was the decisive factor. The Soviets and the
Arab states, which, in light of Israel’s preemption in the 1967 War, had
come out in support of the principle of priority, argued that intent or
purpose were more difficult to ascertain than first strike.116 Stone, capturing
the essence of the debate, asked rhetorically, “[i]s the critical date of the
Middle East Crisis 1973 or 1967, or the first attack by Arab states on Israel
in 1948, or is it the Balfour Declaration in 1917, or the Arab invasions and
conquest of the seventh century, or even perhaps the initial Israelite
conquest of the thirteenth century B.C.?”117 Neither the principle of priority
nor the principle of intent offered a clear solution.
The technique for arriving at a compromise on the priority versus
intent controversy in 1974, according to Ferencz, was “to employ language
that enabled the parties on both sides to interpret the Article to suit their
own prior conception”—the Escher effect writ large.118 In particular, first
strike is decisive (satisfying the Soviet Union and the Arab states), so long
as the strike is 1) in contravention of the UN Charter (no further guidance
is given as to which interventions amount to a Charter contravention); 2)
the Security Council has not determined that the “act of aggression is
justified” (i.e., a justifiable response to provocation, protection against
economic aggression, or preemptive self-defense); or 3) the acts concerned
or their consequences are of sufficient gravity (no guidance is given as to
which acts or consequences meet the de minimis threshold). Rather than
resolving the debate over how to distinguish aggression and self-defense,
the 1974 Definition built the two dominant positions into its articles.
3. The 2009 SWGCA Distinction Between Aggression and SelfDefense
The SWGCA solution to the problem of distinguishing aggression and
self-defense, as introduced earlier, is procedural, not substantive. Article 2
of the 1974 Definition contains the paradoxical principles of priority and
intent. When Article 2 is removed from the 1974 Definition, as the
SWGCA has done in its definition of the crime of aggression, both
115. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Defining Aggression—the Last Mile, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 430,
443 (1973) [hereinafter Ferencz, 1973].
116. Stone, 1977, supra note 105, at 229.
117. Id. at 236.
118. Ferencz, 1975, supra note 103, at 711.
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principles evaporate from the resulting concept of aggression, and
aggression becomes, “the use of armed force against the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations” (Art. 2).
The SWGCA formulation, which contains neither the principle of priority
nor the principle of intent, blurs the distinction between aggression and
self-defense. Whether the SWGCA product is blurrier than the 1974
Definition, which contains both principles and offers no guidance as to how
to balance them, is difficult to ascertain. What is clear is that today, unlike
in 1974, there is a network of judicial bodies including the ICC and the
criminal tribunals of member states, which have incorporated the
provisions of the Rome Statute into their national laws, that can draw upon
customary international law on the use of force and predetermined rules of
evidence and procedure to judge whether a particular claim to self-defense
is justified or pretextual. The removal of the principles of priority and
intent from the definition of the state/collective act, by blurring the line
between aggression and self-defense, is both realistic and risky.
Four dominant schools of thought have emerged in the contemporary
reappraisal of the international law of self-defense, a reappraisal that has
attracted a vast literature since the release of the National Security Strategy
of the United States in 2002.119 The traditionalists argue that the principle
of priority is still the most reasonable rule since relaxing the prohibition on
first-strikes creates a Zeno’s paradox where states are pressured to preempt
each other’s preemptions.120 Opponents of the traditional view invoke the
collapse of the League of Nations, and warn that the international legal
system will not survive if divorced from strategic realities and the practice
of the great powers. The skeptics, on the other hand, believe that the
survival of states is not a matter of law. Michael Glennon, a professor at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, has proclaimed the death of the
Charter prohibitions on the use of force.121 According to Glennon, coherent
international law concerning intervention by states no longer exists. The
received rules neither describe accurately what nations do, nor predict
reliably what they will do, nor describe intelligently what they should do.
119. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Sept. 2002), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/; for a range of
views, see Lori F. Damrosch & Bernard H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 553 (2003).
120. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 207-29 (1980) (describing the
notion of reciprocal fear of surprise attack).
121. Glennon, How International Rules Die, supra note 11; Glennon, The Fog of Law, supra note
11; Glennon, Terrorism and the Limits of Law, supra note 11; Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind,
supra note 11, at A37.
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The implication is that preemption should be the prerogative of each state.
The weakness of the skeptics’ approach is that it justifies the law of the
jungle.
Between the traditionalists and the skeptics lie two reformist schools,
the extenders and the exceptionists. The extenders would widen the
imminence standard contained in the Caroline correspondence, an
exchange of letters in the early 1840s between the United States and
Britain, which has become a classic, though contested, statement of the law
of self-defense in international law.122 According to this standard, “the use
of defensive force is permitted when the “[n]ecessity of that self-defense is
instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”123 The English legal scholar Christopher Greenwood, for
example, argues that received international law does not require States to
wait until it is too late, but it does not give a broad general license for
preemptive military action either.124 When determining whether an attack is
imminent, the gravity of the threat and the way it would materialize are
both relevant. Greenwood’s proposal would accommodate the use of force
against a non-state group in possession of weapons of mass destruction,
even if the moment of the attack remains uncertain. However,
Greenwood’s reliance on a subjective threshold, rather than an objectively
verifiable armed attack, invites abuse.
The exceptionists would preserve the received framework, but
incorporate different types of exceptions. An increasing number of
international lawyers have suggested carving out nuclear proliferation as a
special category triggering a right of preemptive self-defense. They
advocate lowering the imminence bar because the nuclear threat is so
catastrophic. Michael Reisman proposes another type of exception.125
Reisman, like the traditionalists, warns that legalizing unilateral preemptive
self-defense might increase the expectation of, and resort to, violence and
undermine world order. He would curtail self-defense in international law,
but make an exception for the United States, which, he argues, now has a

122. David A. Sadoff, A Question of Determinacy: The Legal Status of Anticipatory Self-Defense,
40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 523, 535-36 (2009).
123. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 9
(2002) (quoting JOHN B. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906)), http://
www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf; HILAIRE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND ARMED CONFLICT, 91-96 (1992); OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 150-52 (1991).
124. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force: Afghanistan,
Al-Qaida, and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 7, 15-16 (2003).
125. Michael Reisman, Editorial Comment, Assessing Claims to Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J.
INT’L L. 82, 90 (2003).
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unique role as guarantor of world order. According to Reisman, the Bush
doctrine contained in NSS 2002 stabilizes expectations without
undermining the international system.126 However, Reisman’s suggestion
requires states to accept American hegemony and trust American
commitments to use its military might for the collective good.
Alternatively, Tom Franck proposes mitigation as a legal safety valve
that preserves the rule of law but prevents it from rendering unreasonable
results in exceptional cases.127 When strict adherence to the law would lead
to catastrophic results, Franck argues that states withhold judgment—just
as domestic courts have withheld judgment when small groups stranded on
a lifeboat eat the cabin boy so the rest of the castaways can survive. He
argues that the majority of states withheld judgment after Israel’s 1967 War
with its Arab neighbors and after the NATO bombing of Kosovo. The
problem with Franck’s proposal is that it does not guide state behavior—
the exception only applies after the military intervention occurs.
4. Suggested Interpretations
Removing Article 2 of the 1974 Definition does not resolve the debate
over the scope of self-defense. Rather, it pushes its resolution to the ICC
judges who are required to make interpretations in concrete cases.
Removing Article 2 would represent a conscious choice on the part of the
SWGCA to recast the question of self-defense as a legal rather than a
political issue, at least in the domain of international criminal law. This is a
positive development. Judges considering concrete cases, unlike working
groups negotiating general principles, have the capacity to devise nuanced
case-by-case solutions that, over time, and in the aggregate—like the
common law—may reveal guiding principles. Furthermore, the
considerations guiding the judicial decisions of ICC judges are less
politicized than the positions of SWGCA delegations representing the
interests of their nations and therefore have the potential to constitute an
impartial, and ideally, a generalizable, approach for fairly adjudicating
cases. Critics of judge-made law in the domain of high politics resist what
they consider to be the judicialization of politics and point out the lack of
democratic accountability of ICC judges. They argue that peace is better
promoted through flexibility and political negotiation rather than through
law. Ferencz and others retort that the current framework of high politics
has failed to curb war and that the time for a legal approach is upon us.

126. See id. at 87, 90.
127. THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED
ATTACKS 174 (2002).
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In their decisions, judges adjudicating aggression cases should be
guided by three considerations. First, a just interpretation should admit no
double standard. Exceptionally, if certain states are granted special powers,
they should also have special responsibilities to use them for the aggregate
good of the community. The non-proliferation treaty was designed this
way. Non-nuclear powers were not supposed to acquire nuclear weapons
and, in exchange, nuclear powers were meant to disarm. The nuclear
powers did not fulfill their side of the bargain and the double standard has
undermined the treaty’s pull to compliance. Today, survey Iranians on
whether the NPT is a just regime and the vast majority will answer “no.”
The double standard criteria would eliminate Reisman’s proposed
exception to the current use of force regime for the United States.
Second, any rule should include widely accepted institutional checks
and balances. It is a basic principle of fairness recognized all over the
world that a party to a dispute should not also be the judge because people
and groups tend to favor their own cause. In spite of its failings, the most
legitimate institutional body to authorize the use of force is still the
Security Council. But the reality is that the Council is a political body often
deadlocked on points of self-interest, and it cannot always be relied upon to
decide fairly. In cases of Security Council deadlock, ICC judges should
also take account of the authorization of established regional bodies, like
the African Union or the Organization of American States—i.e., the next
most legitimate institutional body to authorize force after the SC—since
they have an interest in maintaining a stable neighborhood. Finally, judges
should consider whether the case for self-defense was made publicly,
giving as much information as could safely be divulged at one of these
bodies before acting. If the attack is imminent, and time does not permit
deliberation, the self-defense justification should be formally evaluated by
the ICC judges after the fact. The 2002 and 2006 U.S. National Security
Strategies go too far in their unilateralism.
Third, the rule applied by the ICC judges should not be a suicide pact.
The imminence standard should be relaxed somewhat when the threat is
catastrophic. However, it would be dangerous to relax the standard absent
an increased commitment by states to justify their armed interventions
before the most legitimate international forum available, starting with the
Security Council. If the Security Council, the local regional organization,
and maybe the General Assembly, as a last resort, deny the legitimacy of
the military intervention, this is strong evidence for the ICC judges that the
use of force was illegal and unjustified. For their part, these institutions
must be prepared to convene and decide rapidly. Ultimately, a just
interpretation of the law of self-defense will wisely counterbalance the
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risks of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of extremists and the
risks of creating an environment where no checks and balances exist to
restrain the arbitrary use of military power.
C. The Acts that Qualify as Aggression
1. The 1974 Definition Prior to Its Incorporation into the Crime of
Aggression
At first glance, the 1974 Definition seems to prohibit only the use of
“armed force,” not other uses of force. According to Article 1, “Aggression
is the use of armed force by a State against another state.” Article 2
prohibits the first use of “armed force.” All of the acts of aggression listed
in Article 3—invasion, bombing, blockade, etc.—include the use of armed
force.
The use of armed force was not, however, the only use of force that
the General Assembly committees considered including. A protracted
debate over the inclusion or exclusion of so-called economic aggression
risked paralyzing the working group. The 1967 and 1973 Oil Embargoes,
whereby the oil-producing Arab states sought to deter Israel’s allies from
supporting it militarily by denying them oil, were fresh in the minds of
many delegates. According to Julius Stone, “[a] substantial body of states
continued to press in the Special Committee for inclusion of economic
aggression in the definition.”128 In the midst of paralyzing controversy, the
Special Committee once again accommodated competing positions by
using the drafting technique that gives the 1974 Definition its Escheresque
quality.
In particular, the concept of aggression, which appears
incontrovertible from the perspective of Articles 1, 2, and 3, becomes
bifurcated when considered in light of the definition as a whole. Article 4
qualifies the list of uses of armed force amounting to aggression: “The acts
enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may
determine that other acts constitute aggression under the provisions of the
Charter.” The SWGCA, however, after years of debates, chose not to
include Article 4 of the 1974 Definition in its definition of the crime of
aggression lest it violate the principle of legality by failing to forewarn
potential perpetrators of the acts that are prohibited.
In addition, as Stone points out, “the fact that an alleged aggressor’s
use of armed force had been in response to extreme economic coercion
might be held by the Security Council [or, in the future, the ICC] to be

128. Stone, 1977, supra note 105, at 230.
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among the ‘other relevant circumstances’ which, under Article 2 of the
Consolidated Text [the first use of force is a prima facie act of aggression],
might lead to the conclusion that a finding of aggression was not
justified.”129 The 1974 Definition was drafted so that no concept, including
economic aggression, could be used as a sword by one superpower without
also being used as a shield by the other—so long as their international
lawyers grasped its Escheresque quality.
Article 5(1) qualifies Articles 1, 2, 3, and 4 still further. According to
Article 5(1), “No consideration of whatever nature, whether political,
economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a justification for
aggression.” This seems to cut Stone’s argument down—read literally, the
use of armed force cannot be justified as self-defense in response to
economic aggression. However, read literally, Article 5(1) also removes the
use of armed force as a justified response to an armed attack—no military
consideration can serve as a justification for aggression.
This cannot be correct: the inherent right to self-defense is enshrined
in Article 51 of the UN Charter and general international law. The way to
reconcile Article 51 with the articles preceding it is to notice that no
consideration, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may
serve as a justification for aggression, rather than the use of armed force. In
other words, the use of armed force short of aggression may be justified in
response to political, economic, or military offensives. Whether the use of
economic, diplomatic, or today, cyber force, can trigger the right to use
armed force in self-defense depends upon the interpretation of the 1974
Resolution as a whole.
2. The 2009 SWGCA Concept of the State/Collective Act of
Aggression
The delicate structure of the 1974 Definition, which simultaneously
includes and excludes the use of force not qualifying as armed force within
its provisions, depending upon how the Definition is read, is disturbed
when Articles 2, 4, and 5 are removed, as the SWGCA has done. Articles 1
and 3 of the 1974 Definition, the only articles to be included in the
definition of the crime of aggression, are incontrovertible—only the use of
armed force is prohibited. The removal of the other articles limits the
SWGCA definition of aggression at a time when military planners foresee
an imminent increase in unarmed attacks, including sabotage and
cyberattacks, that disrupt networked systems and cause massive damage.

129. Id.
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The SWGCA did, however, deliberately build in what some
participants considered “constructive ambiguity” as a diplomatic solution
to the debate over whether the list of prohibited acts should be open or
closed.130 Article 8 bis, paragraph 2, which reads, “[a]ny of the following
acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United
Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974,
qualify as an act of aggression,” may be interpreted as either closing or
opening the list that follows. This is because the ambiguous phrase “any of
the following acts” gives little indication as to whether these are the only
acts that qualify as acts of aggression or whether they are meant as
examples. Though this “constructive ambiguity” may leave a tribunal
interpreting the crime some leeway to add new acts, it does not resolve the
question of whether armed attacks are the only acts prohibited by the
definition.
3. Suggested Modifications and Interpretations
Systems disruption, including cyberattacks causing damage akin to an
armed attack, should be included as acts of aggression. This can be done in
one of four ways: the word “armed” can be replaced by another word such
as “destructive”; the crime of aggression can be interpreted in light of the
original 1974 Definition; the listed acts can be incrementally expanded by
analogy; or the word “armed” can be interpreted broadly to include any
tool capable of disrupting a system and causing massive damage.
Replacing the word “armed” in “armed attack” with “destructive”
shifts the focus of the act of aggression from means to effects. Rather than
the attack being “armed,” it must be “destructive” to violate the provision.
In the context of criminal law, this means intentionally destructive. This
modification has the advantage of including future acts that are difficult to
foresee within the ambit of the crime. It accords, moreover, with the moral
sentiment that intentionally destructive behavior is blameworthy by
whatever means it is committed. The weakness of the approach is that it
may overreach, including normal competitive behavior among states.
Another disadvantage is that proposing a controversial drafting
modification of this sort at the review conference, one not firmly based
upon existing international law, may stall the negotiations at the eleventh
hour.

130. International Criminal Court [ICC], Assembly of States Parties, 6th Sess., Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression, Informal Inter-Sessional Meeting of the Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, held at Lichtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Woodrow Wilson
School, Princeton University, United States, June 11-14, 2007, ¶ 47, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1.
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Another way unarmed systems disruptions can be included within the
ambit of the crime is for jurists to interpret the definition of the crime of
aggression in light of the 1974 Definition. As discussed earlier, this
interpretation is natural in light of the language of Paragraph 2 of the draft
definition of the crime of aggression which reads, in relevant part, “Any of
the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance
with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14
December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression.” This could allow for the
inclusion of new means of violence into the list of prohibited acts through
Article 4 of the 1974 Definition, which reads, “The acts enumerated above
are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts
constitute aggression under the provisions of the Charter.” Two problems
arise, however, and both were raised in the SWGCA debates. First, an open
list may violate the principle of legality in criminal law whereby an
accused must be forewarned of the prohibited behavior in order to be
punished for it.131 Second, and related, the Security Council should be kept
separate from the court during the trial or the court’s independence will be
challenged and its legitimacy may be undermined.
An alternative is to analogize from the listed acts to include new acts
of aggression. For example, a denial of service cyberattack, whereby
hackers overwhelm government, military, or other essential systems and
prevent communication with the outside world, may be analogized to a
blockade. There are three main problems with this approach. The first is
that the first sentence of Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute explicitly
prohibits this sort of judicial interpretation: “The definition of a crime shall
be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy.” The second
problem is that not every systems disruption will have an analogy in the list
of prohibited acts. The third problem is that analogizing from the list of
prohibited acts does not get around the explicit identification of “armed
attack” as a requirement for an act to qualify as aggression.
The fourth, and I think the best, solution is for jurists to read the word
“armed” in “armed attack” broadly. Whatever tool is used to attack an
enemy, whether it is a wrench disabling an oil pipeline, a bucket of water
poured on a sensitive electronic device, or a personal computer planting a
virus into a government network, should be considered an armament if the
intention is aggressive and the damage surpasses the de minimis threshold,
amounting to a violation of the UN Charter. This interpretation does not
violate article 22(2) of the Rome Statute because no analogy is necessary,

131. Id. ¶ 50.
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only a broad reading of the word “armed.” Furthermore, the SWGCA does
not need to negotiate any changes to the existing language of the provision.
The larger point, however, is that at a time when warfare is changing
and new methods of committing aggression are becoming increasingly
dangerous, inexpensive, and prevalent, the drafters of the crime of
aggression should employ a method that is forward- as well as backwardlooking. Rather than just negotiating the appropriate precedents and the
way that they are to be incorporated, the drafters and interpreters of the
definition should also consider how new contingencies should impact its
core concepts, properties, and relations.
D. The 1974 Concept of Aggression is Escheresque
The way we evaluate the Escheresque property of the 1974 Resolution
depends upon our understanding of the purpose and function of
international law. The international legal scholars of the day wrestled with
the problem, and their theoretical orientations are evident from their
expectations of what the definition would achieve. Stone’s disappointment
with the text permeates his analysis:
It is indeed dramatic to the point of high tragedy—or is it low
comedy?—that so many of the issues on which the Consensus Definition
of 1974 is silent, or builds into itself the head-on conflicts in the
standpoints of states, are rather central and critical for contemporary
international crises and tensions.132

In this passage, Stone reveals his expectation that legal texts are meant
to be determinate, systematic, and authoritative, and in this regard, his
analysis can be characterized as formalistic. His disappointment stems from
the fact that the 1974 Definition does not accord with the formalist ideal.
Looking back at the 1974 Definition in 2007, Ferencz draws a
different conclusion, a conclusion more in line with the functionalist
sensibility of the international legal establishment of the post World War II
era: “[t]he wording left no doubt that the 1974 consensus definition of
aggression bound no one. It reflected the fears, doubts, and hesitations of
its time. However, it was also a cautious step toward a more rational world
order.”133 Ferencz’s optimism, in spite of the observation, which he shares
with Stone, that the 1974 Definition binds no one, stems from his faith in
the legal process, born at Nuremberg, and his forecast that international law
is headed in the direction of a liberal order.134 On the legal process, Ferencz
132. Stone, 1977, supra note 105, at 225.
133. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression, 6
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 551, 556 (2007) [hereinafter Ferencz, 2007].
134. Ferencz states:
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wrote, “[t]he voluntary surrender of a bit of sovereignty in favor of a
reasonable process for the adjudication of such differences as are bound to
arise, and a system of enforceable sanctions, are further requirements if
reason is to replace barbarism.”135 The creation of the ICC in 1998 fuelled
Ferencz’s optimism that the 1974 Definition would advance his lifelong
project to replace war with law.136 It remains to be seen whether the ICC
will ever have an opportunity to interpret the definition to resolve cases
and, if so, whether it is capable of advancing Ferencz’s lifelong dream of
subverting the law of force with the rule of law.137
Though the state act of the SWGCA definition of aggression is
ultimately more determinate than the 1974 Definition, it is also less
flexible. This is regrettable when there is finally an institutional
arrangement, the Rome System’s network of courts (including the ICC), to
interpret the law and apply it in concrete cases. It is true that determinacy
has its advantages in the judicial realm: a criminal provision that is stark is
less likely to violate the principle of legality and, at the hands of an able
defense team, result in technical acquittals of otherwise blameworthy

The consensus definition of aggression is only a tiny fragment in a much broader mosaic. It is
a tool which may be used to help build a more peaceful society of States. States that recognize
that they are interdependent and not independent, that cherish and nurture their cultural and
religious heritages without seeking to impose them on anyone else, that have the right to
organize their own political and economic systems in whatever manner seems to them to best
serve the happiness of their peoples, must also recognize that, in their own self-interest, they
may have to surrender some portion of their sovereignty, their wealth and their power in order
that the hopes and aspirations of all mankind may be fulfilled.
Ferencz, 1975, supra note 103, at 717.
135. Ferencz, 1973, supra note 115, at 462.
136. Benjamin B. Ferencz, Reconciling Legitimate Concerns and Removing the Lock from the
Courthouse Door, May 2008, http://www.benferencz.org/ (follow “Articles and Lectures” hyperlink;
then follow “Speaking Frankly About Aggression” hyperlink).
137. What holds true for Stone and Ferencz can be generalized to other theorists of international
law. The way that they evaluate the 1974 Definition, whether they actually undertook that exercise or
not, depends upon their expectations about the purpose and function of international law. Myres
McDougal and Harold Lasswell’s policy-oriented school of jurisprudence, developed at the time the
1974 Definition was being negotiated, eschewed positivist approaches and held that the overriding goal
of international law was to arrive at solutions that reflect the global common interest in approximating a
world public order of human dignity. Myres S. McDougal & Florentino P. Feliciano, Legal Regulation
of Resort to International Coercion: Aggression and Self-Defense in Policy Perspective, 68 YALE L.J.
1057 (1959); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR:
TRANSNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (New Haven Press 1994) (1961 originally
published as LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL COERCION). Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich, and Andreas Lowenfeld’s international
legal process school, developed at Harvard Law School in the 1960s, with its confidence in institutional
settlement, concentrates not so much on the exposition of rules and their content as on how international
law rules are actually deployed by the makers of foreign policy. ABRAM CHAYES, THOMAS EHRLICH &
ANDREAS LOWENFELD, 1 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR AN INTRODUCTORY
COURSE (1968).
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defendants. The risk, however, is that an inflexible crime will undermine
the legitimacy of the court and the law in other ways, in particular by
becoming irrelevant as times change. The challenge, faced by the drafters
of the crime of aggression but not unique to them, is how to best balance
the demands of certainty and flexibility in their definition. The grounded
theory method offers them specific insights about how to go about doing
this. Once the definition is implemented, the judges take over and are faced
with the same challenge as they interpret the law.
IV. CONCEPTUALIZING THE INDIVIDUAL’S PARTICIPATION IN
COLLECTIVE ACT OF AGGRESSION
In his essay, Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War
Crimes, David Cohen poses the key question for this part of the paper.
Unlike ordinary domestic crimes, mass atrocities are,
the product of collective, systematic, bureaucratic activity, made possible
only by the collaboration of massive and complex organizations in the
execution of criminal policies initiated at the highest levels of
government. How, then, is individual responsibility to be located,
limited, and defined within the vast bureaucratic apparatuses that make
possible the pulling of a trigger or the dropping of a gas canister in some
far-flung place?138

The SWGCA has negotiated an answer to Cohen’s question in the
form of three interrelated legal mechanisms that serve as a conceptual link
between the individual and the state/collective act: 1) a leadership clause;
2) a set of conduct verbs describing the culpable conduct; and 3) a liability
doctrine setting out the nature of the defendant’s relationship to the
aggressive group. The following sub-Parts consider these components in
turn, test them against the future aggression scenarios set out in Part II, and,
following the grounded theory approach through, suggest incremental
modifications and interpretations that bring the definition of the crime of
aggression up to date.
A. The Leadership Clause
The leadership clause is a phrase within the definition of the crime of
aggression that limits the reach of the crime to leaders and excludes
followers. Since Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, Coordinator of the
PrepCom working group, released her 2002 Discussion Paper, there has
been near consensus among delegates that the crime of aggression should

138. David Cohen, Beyond Nuremberg: Individual Responsibility for War Crimes, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG TO BOSNIA, 53, 53 (Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds.,
1999).
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apply only to leaders and that a leader is a person “in a position effectively
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a
State.”139 The components of the leadership clause are, 1) the position of
the person in the organization, 2) his or her capacity to exercise effective
control or to direct, 3) political or military action, and 4) the nature of the
aggressive collective as a state. This sub-Part, as the previous sub-Parts of
Part III have done, will situate the draft leadership clause historically,
decipher its components, test these components against the future scenarios
set out in Part II, and suggest incremental modifications and interpretations
that will tailor this clause to the future aggression scenarios set out in
Part II.
1. Conceptual Roots of the Leadership Clause
The SWGCA leadership clause is descended from an influential preWorld War II concept of leadership set out by the German sociologist Max
Weber that is still relevant today, but not nearly as much as it was when
Weber devised it and when the Nuremberg tribunals delivered their
verdicts. In Politics as a Vocation, Weber sets out his evolutionary
taxonomy of political leadership with three methods to “legitimate any
rule,” from least to most advanced.140 Traditional leadership, “exercised by
the patriarchs and patrimonial rulers of the old style,” is “sanctified by a
validity that extends back into the mists of time and is perpetuated by
habit.”141 Charismatic leadership, “practiced by prophets or—in the
political sphere—the elected warlord or the ruler chosen by popular vote,
the great demagogue, and the leaders of political parties,” finds its authority
in the “extraordinary, personal gift of grace or charisma, that is, the wholly
personal devotion to, and a personal trust in, the revelations, heroism, or
other leadership qualities of an individual.”142 Weber’s highest form of
leadership, “rule by virtue of ‘legality’,” “found in the modern ‘servant of
the state’,” is authoritative by virtue of “the belief in the validity of legal
139. 2002 Discussion Paper, supra note 111, art. 1; ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Resumed 5th
Sess., New York. Jan. 29-Feb. 1, 2007, Discussion Paper Proposed by the Chairman, at I(1)(a)-(b),
ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/2,
Annex,
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-5SWGCA-2_English.pdf [hereinafter Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper]; Non-Paper by the Chairman
on Defining the Individual’s Conduct, in ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on
the Crime of Aggression, 6th Sess., New York, Nov. 30-Dec. 14, 2007, Report of the Special Working
Group on the Crime of Aggression, Annex, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/1, http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/SWGCA/ICC-ASP-6-SWGCA-1_English.pdf [hereinafter Chairman’s 2007
Non-Paper on Defining the Individual’s Conduct].
140. MAX WEBER, POLITICS AS A VOCATION (1919), reprinted in THE VOCATION LECTURES 32, 34
(David Owen & Tracy B. Strong eds., Rodney Livingstone trans., 2004) (emphasis omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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statutes and practical ‘competence’ based on rationally created rules.”143
Weber’s highest form of leadership corresponds to his concept of
bureaucracy, a rational-legal structure of authority, which he described and
popularized in Economy and Society in 1914.144 When Weber wrote
Economy and Society, bureaucracy was becoming the most effective means
of coordinating large organizations, including governments and militaries.
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) based its
reasoning upon an organizational model that coincides closely with
Weber’s when judging the Nazis after World War II. Subsequently, the
Nuremberg precedent became the inspiration for the Rome Statute and the
emerging definition of the Crime of Aggression, born of the London
Charter’s Article 6(1), “Crimes Against Peace.” The IMT, after a brief
introduction and description of the provisions of the London Charter,
presented a detailed history of the evolution of the bureaucratic structure of
the Nazi organization and its consolidation of power.145 This is an account
of the charismatic leader, Hitler, and his willing accomplices, the
defendants, as they transformed a “small political party called the German
Labor Party”146 into an all-pervasive and rationally organized government
bureaucracy legitimized by law, where the defendants held top offices and
used the organization to engineer massive crimes.
Even though the IMT judgment reflected a Weberian concept of
leadership, there were glimmers of recognition by the tribunal that the
bureaucratic model did not capture the whole story of the Nazis’ rise to and
exercise of power. For example, the IMT and its successor tribunals
wrestled with the status of business leaders, non-state actors who did not
hold formal positions or exercise effective control in the Nazis’
bureaucratic apparatus, but whom the Allied populations felt should be held
criminally responsible nonetheless. “Hitler could not make aggressive war
by himself,” the IMT held: “[h]e had to have the cooperation of statesmen,
military leaders, diplomats and business men.”147 The successor tribunals
followed the lead of the IMT and prosecuted business leaders for waging
aggressive war. The I.G. Farben Judgment affirmed that business leaders
are included, as a matter of law, in the provision on crimes against peace,148

143. Id. (emphasis omitted).
144. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 956
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
145. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 413-21.
146. Id. at 413.
147. Id. at 448.
148. However, the defendants were acquitted because the tribunal found that “[t]he evidence falls
far short of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that their endeavours and activities [the rearmament
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but the disproportionate number of acquittals of business leaders in relation
to political and military leaders in this case and others indicates uneasiness
on the part of the judges with the prospect of including them within the
ambit of the crime.149
Ultimately, in spite of the Nuremberg Tribunal’s reflections on
business leaders, its core concept of leadership envisaged an individual
holding high office or a high top position within a complex bureaucracy,
exercising formal and effective control over the political or military action
of a state. This was a sociologically accurate description of leadership
within the Nazi organization. The Nuremberg concept of leadership, which
serves as the basis of the leadership clause of the definition of the crime of
aggression, is not a sociologically accurate description of leadership within
Al Qaeda and the vast number of aggressive organizations emerging today.
It does not require a major redrafting or a radical interpretation, however,
to bring the clause up to date.
2. The Leadership Clause in the Draft Definition of the Crime of
Aggression
The SWGCA, in order to remain true to precedent and garner the
greatest possible support at the 2010 review conference, closely modeled
the leadership clause of the crime of aggression upon the Nuremberg
Tribunal’s concept. The SWGCA, however, made two slight modifications
that broaden the modern concept somewhat. These modifications
acknowledge the changing character of leadership, but are still not adequate
to capture new forms of leadership that scenario forecasters such as
Heckscher and Donnellon150 anticipate. The first modification is a shift in
focus from formal position to include effective control as a marker of
leadership: “‘crime of aggression’ means the planning, preparation,
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control.” The second is the insertion of the word “direct” as an alternative
way that an individual may be identified as a leader.
By including “effective control” as a core property of leadership rather
than only formal “position,” the SWGCA has created a definition that
of Germany] were undertaken and carried out with the knowledge that they were thereby preparing
Germany for participation in an aggressive war.” I.G. Farben, International Military Tribunal,
Judgment, July 30, 1948, at 1123, reprinted in VIII TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS (1952).
149. In I.G. Farben, 24 defendants were acquitted because the tribunal found that “[t]he evidence
falls far short of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that their endeavours and activities [the
rearmament of Germany] were undertaken and carried out with the knowledge that they were thereby
preparing Germany for participation in an aggressive war.” I.G. Farben, supra note 148, at 1123.
150. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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includes informal leaders—individuals who hold no formal position but
who effectively control the political or military action of a state. This
inclusion would, for instance, capture business and religious leaders while
formal control would not. Though effective control is a sociologically
appropriate evolution from formal position because it captures important
contemporary aspects of leadership, it suffers from two problems as a
property of the leadership qualifier of the crime of aggression. The first is
its conceptual origin as a transplant from an unrelated legal context. The
second is that “effective control” does not go far enough to capture the
leaders of post-bureaucratic organizations.
“Effective control” is the standard the International Court of Justice
used in 1986 to assess whether the United States should be held
accountable for acts carried out by Contra guerillas in Nicaragua.151 It was
not originally meant as a way to attribute state action to an individual
leader. The “effective control” standard gives the impression of being
legitimate precedent for the SWGCA without actually being on point.
Strictly speaking, it should not lend legitimacy to the definition of the
crime of aggression by virtue of its precedential value. Overlooking, for the
moment, the question of its conceptual origins, the “effective control”
standard was later countenanced by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia in the Tadić Case by a more permissive “overall
control” test152 that would have done a better job at capturing the
individuals most responsible in post-bureaucratic organizations. “Effective
control” would likely not have captured Osama Bin Laden’s involvement
in the 9/11 attacks, while “overall control” would have had a better chance.
The main problem with the “effective control” standard, whatever its
origins may be, is that, as the grounded theorists would say, it does not fit
well with the changing structure of aggressive organizations (see Part II).
Rather than formal or effective control, centrality within a social network
and the influence of an individual within that network are rapidly emerging
as important properties of leadership.153 Centrality and influence within the
disaggregated network of networks that is al Qaeda would encapsulate Bin
Laden and link him to the 9/11 attacks, while effective control would not.
3. Suggested Modifications and/or Interpretations
Three avenues exist for incorporating contemporary social scientific
insights into the leadership clause of the crime of aggression: the SWGCA
151. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
65 (June 27).
152. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 146 (July 15, 1999).
153. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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can modify the clause and present it to states to vote on at the 2010 review
conference; the SWGCA can build the changes into the elements of the
crime of aggression; or, the judges can read the changes into the existing
clause through the word “direct.”
If the SWGCA chooses to modify the leadership clause, one possible
formulation is:
A leader is a [central/focal] person in a position effectively to exercise
control over[, determinatively influence,] or to direct the political or
military action of a State [/Group].

This formulation is closely based upon the original SWGCA
leadership clause, but it includes modifications derived from forecasts on
leadership that can be incorporated independently of one another or in
conjunction.
First, these drafting changes capture leaders within the bureaucratic
model who are “in a position” to exercise control over subordinates. The
Weberian property of formal position, an element of his pure-type rationallegal authority, was the original inspiration for this component of the
leadership clause. The SWGCA leadership clause might be modified to
include individuals in post-bureaucratic organizations who exercise power
by virtue of their central or focal position in the organization by adding one
of these terms into the definition (the first set of square brackets above).
However, because of the ambiguity of the word “position”—it might as
easily refer to formal position as position within a social network—an
explicit modification of the existing leadership clause is not strictly
necessary. If the SWGCA wishes to make the double meaning of the term
“position” explicit in order to put the expansion of the concept of
leadership to a vote by States, it can do so in the elements of the crime.
Alternatively, the ASP can choose to leave it to the judges to decide on the
meaning of “position.” In this case, the bench must be aware of the possible
double meaning. This can be done by clearly describing the double
meaning of “position” in an official report of the SWGCA or at the review
conference.
Effective control is the second Weberian concept that should be
expanded to capture aggressive leaders within post-bureaucratic
organizations. In the discussion above, “influence” was identified as an
alternative component of responsibility that has supplemented, and
frequently replaced, the concept of effective control in aggressive
organizations. The terms “determinatively influence” could be added to the
existing leadership clause to bring it up to date. The nature of this influence
can be narrow or broad and preceded by a qualifier akin to
“determinatively,” or not. The key modification is that the term “influence”
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captures charismatic (or transformational) leaders,154 brokers between
organizations,155 and catalysts,156 whereas the Nuremberg-era concept does
not. Instead of explicitly altering the existing leadership clause, the term
“or to direct” may be read to include “determinatively influence.” States
preferring to supplement “effective control” with “influence” (with or
without a qualifier akin to “determinatively”) might, as with the first
proposed modification described above, build “influence” into the elements
or leave it to the judges to interpret the term “direct” to include it.
4. The Conduct Verbs
The conduct verbs are meant to link the individual leader to the
collective act of aggression by describing what the leader actually does—
the culpable conduct. The conduct verbs in the emerging crime of
aggression were extracted directly from Article 6(a) of the London Charter
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, except the last one,
which is a modern variation on the Nuremberg-era verb.157 There is a near
consensus among SWGCA delegates that “planning, preparation, initiation
and execution” of an act of aggression/armed attack is the culpable
conduct.158 These conduct verbs are based on a Nuremberg-era concept of
leadership, a concept that, in this section, will be tested against an
important contemporary critique.
5. Conceptual Roots of the Conduct Verbs
The Nuremberg-era conduct verbs correspond closely with the
behavioral concept of leadership devised by the French Scholar Henri
Fayol, the father of modern operational management theory. In his seminal

154. See JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, LEADERSHIP 244 (1978); see also Boas Shamir, Robert J.
House & Michael B. Arthur, The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: A Self-Concept
Based Theory, 4 ORG. SCI. 577, 577 (1993).
155. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER S. STEWART, HUNTING THE TIGER: THE FAST LIFE AND VIOLENT
DEATH OF THE BALKANS’ MOST DANGEROUS MAN (2007) (discussing Željko Ražnatović, leader of the
transnational Serb paramilitary group Arkan’s Tigers).
156. ORI BRAFMAN & ROD A. BECKSTROM, THE STARFISH AND THE SPIDER: THE UNSTOPPABLE
POWER OF LEADERLESS ORGANIZATIONS 92 (2006) (“In open organizations, a catalyst is the person
who initiates a circle and then fades away into the background.”).
157. As an advisor to the SWGCA, the author observed that the SWGCA replaced the final conduct
verb of Article 6(a) of the London Charter, “waging”( “waging of a war of aggression”) with
“execution.” It was decided that waging did not fit as well as “execution” with “act of aggression” or
“armed attack,” and that the terms captured similar conduct.
158. See Chairman’s 2007 Discussion Paper, supra note 139, at ¶ 1; Chairman’s 2007 Non-Paper
on Defining the Individual’s Conduct, supra note 139, at ¶ 13 (“Without disregarding the different
preferences of individual States, it is probably fair to say that no one present at Princeton 2007 would
stay in the way of consensus about the conduct clause were the Review Conference tomorrow.”); 2002
Discussion Paper, supra note 111, at ¶ 4.
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1917 text, “Administration industrielle et générale,”159 Fayol proposed five
“primary functions of management”: planning, organizing, commanding,
coordinating, and controlling.160 Fayol’s primary functions of management
and the behavioral approach he devised match so closely with the conduct
verbs and concept of leadership of the London Charter—planning,
preparation, initiation, and waging—that there is a strong case to be made
that the drafters of the London Charter were influenced by the Frenchman’s
work.161 Furthermore, Fayol’s principles of management—specialization of
labor, authority, discipline, unity of command, unity of direction (topdown), subordination of individual interests, fair remuneration,
centralization, formal chain of command, order, equity of treatment, limited
turnover of personnel, initiative, and cohesion among personnel—coincide
closely with the description of the Nazi organization as a bureaucracy that
the IMT sets out in its judgment.162
Whether Fayol’s “primary functions of management” directly or
indirectly inspired the conduct verbs in the London Charter and,
subsequently, the SWGCA link between the individual and the
state/collective act, is an interesting historical question. However, it is not
Fayol’s theory that is most significant for this analysis, but the scholarship
of his primary critic, the Canadian management scholar, Henry
Mintzberg.163 Mintzberg offers an appraisal of Fayol’s work that sheds
light on the concept of individual culpability used by the Nuremberg
tribunal. In Mintzberg’s empirical studies of managerial work, spanning the
1970s and 1980s, he studies managers of all sorts164 and analyzes whether
his subjects spend their time planning, organizing, influencing, leading, and
controlling. “A synthesis of these findings,” concludes Mintzberg, “paints
an interesting picture. One as different from Fayol’s classic view165 as a
cubist abstract is from a renaissance painting.” Mintzberg finds that
managerial behaviors are far more fragmented—giving out a gold watch,
159. HENRI FAYOL, ADMINISTRATION INDUSTRIELLE ET GÉNÉRALE (Paris, 1917) (also available as
HENRI FAYOL, INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION (J.A. Coubrough trans., 1930)).
160. Id.
161. Fayol’s treatise and the English translation were published soon before the London Charter
was negotiated. By the time of the negotiations, his work was widely known.
162. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 175-83.
163. See HENRY MINTZBERG, THE NATURE OF MANAGERIAL WORK (Prentice-Hall 1980) (1973);
See also Henry Mintzberg, The Manager’s Job: Folklore and Fact, 53 HARV. BUS. REV. 49 (1975),
(reprinted Mar.-Apr. 1990) [hereinafter Mintzberg 1975].
164. See Mintzberg 1975, supra note 163, at 164 (“Foremen, factory supervisors, staff managers,
field sales managers, hospital administrators presidents of companies and nations, and even street gang
leaders.”).
165. According to Mintzberg, the French industrialist Henri Fayol introduced the words planning,
organizing, influencing, leading and controlling in 1916 to describe what managers do. Id. at 163.
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attending a conference, making calls after a factory burns down—and, on
the basis of these findings, he issues a warning, “don’t be surprised if you
can’t relate what you see to these words.”166
In accordance with Mintzberg’s critique, the Nuremberg Tribunal fails
to consistently operationalize and/or apply the conduct verbs from Article
6(a) of the London Charter to the behavior of individual defendants. One
possible explanation, derived from Mintzberg’s work, is that while the
conduct verbs describe what leaders do, they are too abstract to guide the
judge’s interpretations and produce consistent results throughout the
judgment, especially given the diverse activities in which leaders engage.167
“Planning,” the conduct verb that received the most attention in the IMT
judgment, serves a dual function as both a conduct verb and as an element
of the separate crime of conspiracy, but was defined predominantly along
the shallow lines of attendance at Hitler’s key meetings in order for the
tribunal to establish the minimum mens rea of knowledge of Hitler’s
aggressive plans.168 Betraying the tribunal’s difficulty in precisely
delineating the bounds of planning, the justices noted in the final judgment
that
[p]lanning and preparation are essential to the making of war. . . .
[A]gressive war is a crime under International Law. The Charter defines
this offence [sic] as planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression “or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment . . . of the forgoing.” The Indictment follows this
distinction. Count One charges the Common Plan or Conspiracy. Count
Two charges the planning and waging of war. The same evidence[,
attendance at Hitler’s key meetings] has been introduced to support both
counts. We shall therefore discuss both counts together, as they are in
substance the same.169

Absent defined bounds, “preparation” is likewise difficult to employ
consistently given the myriad of activities that can be considered to fall
under the term. The tribunal evinced this difficulty throughout its
judgment, as it repeatedly confused its conception of the term. At one

166. Id.
167. Roger Clark, in his analysis of the conduct verbs in the London Charter’s crime against peace
and their application by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg concludes, “It is all very
rough and ready, both in the general explanations and in applying the Charter to the individuals. The
ultimate challenge that Nuremberg leaves us with in respect of the crime against peace is whether
twenty-first century drafters can do better than those in London sixty-one years ago. It is still a daunting
task.” Roger Clark, Nuremberg and the Crime Against Peace, 6 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 527,
550 (2007).
168. E.g., Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 423-25, 447-49; 1 Nuremberg Trial Proceedings
2-11 (1945).
169. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 447.
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extreme, the IMT determined early in its judgment that Mein Kampf, the
book written by Hitler in prison, constituted preparation. “Mein Kampf, the
justices concluded,
was no mere private diary . . . . The general contents are well known.
Over and over again Hitler asserted his belief in the necessity of force as
the means of solving international problems . . . . Mein Kampf is not to
be regarded as a mere literary exercise . . . . Its importance lies in the
unmistakable attitude of aggression revealed throughout its pages.170

At the other end of the spectrum, Hitler’s meetings with his highestranking military commanders was also considered preparation.171 Adding to
its confusion, the tribunal also arbitrarily placed “preparation” both before
and after Hitler’s plans to invade surrounding countries.172 Discussing the
conquest of Austria, the IMT noted that “[t]he invasion of Austria was a
premeditated aggressive step in furthering the plan to wage aggressive wars
against other countries.”173 It is unclear from this declaration when
preparation ended, and when execution of the Second World War began.
Clearly, the invasion of Austria was a necessary and preliminary step in
Hitler’s grand plan to conquer Europe, but it was also an act of aggression
itself. Can the same action be simultaneously an aggressive war and a
preparatory step? At what point did Hitler’s preparation end and his war on
Europe begin, and on which side of the dividing line should the annexation
of the Sudetenland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia fall? The tribunal’s
blurred hints provide no answer.174 These conduct verbs, applied today, risk
violating the principle of legality contained in Article 22, paragraph 2 of
the Rome Statute which forewarns, in the second sentence, “[i]n case of
ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour [sic] of the person
being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.”175
6. Suggested Modifications and/or Interpretations
The solution, based on Mintzberg’s critique of Fayol, is to further
flesh out the properties of the conduct verbs, which, as they stand, are
abstract enough to capture both classic and contemporary concepts of
170. Id. at 422-23.
171. Id. at 423-25.
172. E.g., id. at 425-42.
173. Id. at 425.
174. Roger Clark has an alternative explanation: “My take on Sudetenland etc is not that the
Tribunal had trouble with the verbs, but that it got hung up on the ‘war’ requirement.” E-mail from
Roger Clark, Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law – Camden, to Noah Weisbord, Visiting
Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law (Nov. 2, 2009 15:43:08 EST) (on file with author);
See Roger Clark, Nuremberg and the Crime Against Peace, 6 WASH. UNIV. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
527, 535 (2007).
175. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 22, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 104.
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leadership. Properties can be drawn from the jurisprudence of the nations
participating in the negotiations. Legal scholars can assist the SWGCA by
setting out, analyzing, and commenting upon the content of the conduct
verbs in their jurisdictions. The properties of these Nuremberg-era conduct
verbs, at least, should be forward-looking in order to capture new
contingencies.
There are two different ways that new properties can be incorporated
into the definition of aggression. The drafters might include a list of
culpable behaviors for each conduct verb in the official document
describing the elements of the crime of aggression. The elements offer
guidance to the bench that is more specific than the provision itself, in
particular, pertaining to the conduct, consequences, and circumstances
associated with each crime.176 The elements, however, are only meant to
clarify what was agreed upon in the definition. The risk of re-opening the
discussion, once again, is deadlock at the review conference
Alternatively, the ASP might leave it to the judges to interpret the
terms. While deferring the question to the judges would help the delegates
at the 2010 review conference to avoid another last minute controversy,
this approach risks results similar to the Nuremberg judgment unless the
ICC judges are aware of the problem identified by Mintzberg and prepared
to flesh out the properties of the conduct verbs in their judgments. Even
then, the defendant at the first aggression case, who will be on trial before
the judges flesh out the properties of the conduct verbs, will be justified in
raising Article 22, paragraph 2, the principle of legality, in his or her
defense. This is a perennial point of contention of relying on judges to
develop criminal law jurisprudence in the common law style in a mixed
system (common and civil) of international criminal law.
When contemplating properties of the conduct verbs, the ASP or the
bench should not only look to definitions of individual conduct from past
judicial decisions, but also account for future contingencies. Face-to-face
meetings convened by a leader and his ministers accompanied by redacted
minutes are one way among many that planning takes place today.
Alternatively, people who have never met who are advancing divergent
agendas, such as local religious leaders and transnational criminal
gangsters, may be involved in the same aggressive plan for different
reasons and communicate through signals on a publicly accessible web site.
Different contributions to the planning of swarming attacks should also be

176. See International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2
(2000), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/iccelementsofcrimes.html (discussing
elements of crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court).
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contemplated, as swarming is an increasingly prevalent method of
contemporary warfare and is, according to some forecasts, likely to become
still more important in the foreseeable future.177 The swarming
phenomenon may offer insights about the core properties of the concept of
planning that should be considered. Ideally, the definition of planning will
be cast specifically enough to forewarn potential perpetrators that their
involvement may be criminal, yet broadly enough to allow for different
ways that the meeting of minds can take place. Examples of key properties
of the concept of planning drawn from national jurisprudence are the
existence of a proposal, the level of detail of the proposal, the level of
involvement of an individual in the proposal, the intent that the illegal
result should come about, and a meeting of minds (not necessarily in
person) where two or more people are involved. Whenever possible,
empirically verifiable indicators of the prohibited conduct should be
included as properties of the conduct verb. The challenge for drafters and
interpreters of the conduct verbs, like the drafters and interpreters of any
criminal prohibition, is to satisfy the demands of legality, a backwardlooking concept, while accommodating future contingencies. While the
judges have a variety of interpretive tools at their disposal to delineate the
contours of the concept, the diplomats negotiating the definition must base
its contours on the agreement they are able to achieve.
C. Liability Doctrine: Conspiracy, Command Responsibility, Joint
Criminal Enterprise, and Future Aggression Scenarios
When it comes to crimes committed by “the action of a multitude of
persons,” 178—the crime of aggression is the paradigmatic example179—
individuals usually commit parts of the whole. Any successful concept of
liability for the crime of aggression must convincingly place the individual
contribution in the context of the collective act so that the individual
punishment fits each individual’s contribution to the collective crime.
Towards this end, the legal systems of the world have generated a number
of concepts meant to apportion individual blame for collective acts.
Conspiracy, organizational guilt, superior (or command) responsibility, and

177. See JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, SWARMING & THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT vii (2000)
(“Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to
strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/or fire, close-in as well as from
stand-off positions. It will work best—perhaps it will only work—if it is designed mainly around the
deployment of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units (what we call “pods” organized in
“clusters”)”).
178. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 181 (2003).
179. But see ROBB, supra note 54, at 8-9 (describing the superempowered individual).
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joint criminal enterprise (or enterprise participation) are four examples.
Joint criminal enterprise, specially tailored, is the most promising
conceptual link for the crime of aggression. Joint criminal enterprise finds
its roots in the older doctrine of conspiracy.
1. Conceptual Roots and Properties of the Liability Doctrines
Conspiracy, an inchoate crime arising out of the common law
tradition,180 is an agreement by individuals to commit an unlawful act, with
the intent of each individual to achieve the collective purpose, and minimal
conduct that furthers the agreement.181 The concept of conspiracy has not
been accepted by most civil law jurisdictions, which, instead, prohibit
“criminal association,” a much narrower offense.182 In contemporary
international criminal law, which melds civil and common law traditions,
conspiracy applies only to the crime of genocide,183 on the theory that
genocide is the most heinous crime, and a permissive doctrine is justified in
order to ensure that perpetrators are punished.184 To accord with civilian
sensibilities—over half the world’s nations are civil law jurisdictions—the
concept that connects the individual to the collective act of aggression
should be narrower than conspiracy.
In the wake of World War II, the Allied Powers, facing the prospect of
trying thousands of defendants, incorporated a novel concept of
organizational guilt into the London Charter that was inspired by the
common law concept of conspiracy.185 In accordance with this concept,
whose creation is attributed to United States War Department lawyer
Murray Bernays, the Nazi organizations would be indicted and tribunals
would penalize individual membership itself, thereby shifting the burden
onto the defendant to prove that they were coerced into joining in order to

180. Inchoate Crimes are “acts that: (i) are preparatory to prohibited offenses, (ii) have not been
completed, therefore have not yet caused any harm, and (iii) are punished on their own, that is, in spite
of he fact that they have not led to a complete offense.” CASSESE, supra note 178, at 190.
181. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (8th ed. 2004). Conspiracy arose from the common law and
does not exist in many civil law jurisdictions. Rachael Lorna Johnstone, State Responsibility: A
Concerto for Court, Council and Committee, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 63, 71 (2008).
182. See Alexander D. Tripp, Comment, Margins of the Mob: A Comparison of Reves v. Ernst &
Young with Criminal Association Laws in Italy and France, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 263 (1996).
183. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 2(3)(b), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M
1598 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
184. CASSESE, supra note 178, at 191.
185. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the major War Criminals of the European
Axis, London Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, arts. 9-10, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter IMT Charter].
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escape punishment.186 The IMT was troubled by Barnays’ concept and
modified it in its judgment, ruling that the prosecution must prove, amongst
other requirements, that individual members were aware of the collective
purpose of the organization in order to justify punishment.187 Meanwhile,
the Nuremberg provision on crimes against peace, Article 6(a) of the
London Charter, included its own notion of individual responsibility for
collective action whereby conspiracy to commit crimes against peace was
an independent inchoate crime. The tribunal left the concept in Article 6(a)
intact and found eight of the twenty-two defendants guilty under the
provision.188
The Nuremberg concept of organizational guilt does not gracefully
accommodate post-bureaucratic organizations with no formal membership
requirement and weak links between members who participate in criminal
acts for diverse reasons. Furthermore, the Nuremberg-era crime of
conspiracy is a separate offense, not a link between a state/group act of
aggression and an individual. In short, the Nuremberg-era link is not an
ideal component for the SWGCA’s draft definition of aggression.
The modern concept of superior (or command) responsibility is
another legal solution to the problem of attributing individual responsibility
for collective action. The concept is often traced to the Lieber Code,189 the
Hague Conventions of 1907,190 and the trial of Emil Muller in Leipzig after
World War I.191 According to Professor Mark Osiel, “[s]uperior
186. See Stanislaw Pomorski, Conspiracy and Criminal Organizations, in THE NUREMBERG TRIAL
LAW 213, 215-16 (George Ginsburgs & V.N. Kudriavtsev eds., 1990); see also
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL MEMOIR 75 (1992).
187. See Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 2, at 469 (“A criminal organization is analogous to a
criminal conspiracy in that the essence of both is cooperation for criminal purposes. There must be a
group bound together and organized for a common purpose. The group must be formed or used in
connection with the commission of crimes denounced by the Charter. Since the declaration with respect
to the organizations and groups will, as has been pointed out, fix the criminality of its members, that
definition should exclude persons who had no knowledge of the criminal purposes or acts of the
organization and those who were drafted by the State for membership, unless they were personally
implicated in the commission of acts declared criminal by Article 6 of the Charter as members of the
organization. Membership alone is not enough to come within the scope of these declarations.”).
188. Pomorski, supra note 186, at 235.
189. Francis Lieber, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN
THE FIELD, BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, APRIL 24, (1863), reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY
HARTIGAN, LIEBER'S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45, 45-71 (1983).
190. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277,
T.S. 539 (1907); Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva
Convention, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351, T.S. 543.
191. See German War Trials: Judgment in the Case of Emil Muller (May 30, 1921), reprinted in 16
AM. J. INT’L L. 684 (1922); see also Stuart E. Hendin, Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in
the Twentieth Century-A Century of Evolution, 10 MURDOCH U. ELECTRONIC J.L. 1 (2003), available at
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n1/hendin101nf.html#Up%20to%201900_T;
Edoardo
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responsibility places a decided emphasis—both rhetorical and
substantive—on the chain of command and how power passes through it,
from top to bottom. It stresses the formal, hierarchical structure of military
organizations.”192 Allison Danner and Jenny Martinez describe two forms
of command responsibility: active and passive.193 In active command
responsibility, the leader takes active steps to bring about a crime, while in
passive command responsibility, the leader “knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.” 194 To prove either form of
superior responsibility, the prosecutor must show the required mens rea
(the superior “knew or had reason to know”), a superior-subordinate
relationship, and the superior’s failure to prevent or punish the
subordinates’ wrongs.195 Osiel observes that superior responsibility
comports with the sociological features of mass atrocity “where criminal
policymaking and control over events concentrate at the top of a
bureaucratic hierarchy.” 196
The concept of superior responsibility becomes nonsensical when
applied to the crime of aggression. Because the crime of aggression is, by
definition, a crime committed by superiors, superiors cannot be held
responsible for crimes of aggression committed by their subordinates. The
leadership qualifier in the emerging SWGCA definition, which limits the
concept to “a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to
direct the political or military action of a State,” makes the emerging crime
incompatible with the existing doctrine of superior responsibility as
contained in Article 28 of the Rome Statute. This leaves the drafters of the
crime of aggression two options: they can add a clause to the crime
explicitly excluding Article 28, or they can leave it to the judges to
recognize the clumsy conceptual fit and avoid the doctrine of superior
Greppi, The Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law, 835 INT’L R. OF
THE RED CROSS 531 (Oct. 30, 1999). These materials provide short histories of the concept of superior
responsibility.
192. Mark Osiel, The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1751, 1770 (2005).
193. Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise,
Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal Law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 120
(2005).
194. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 7(3), May 25,
1993, 32 I.L.M 1192 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda art. 6(3), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M 1602; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 28, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999.
195. ICTY Statute, supra note 194, art. 7(3).
196. Osiel, supra note 192, at 1770.
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responsibility altogether when judging individuals for the crime of
aggression.
The doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE), rather than superior
responsibility or conspiracy, in light of the scenarios set out in Part II and
the conceptual considerations just described, is the most appropriate
liability doctrine for the definition for the crime of aggression.
2. Proposed Liability Doctrine for the Crime of Aggression
JCE is rapidly becoming the most important concept in international
criminal law to apportion individual blame for collective acts and can serve
as a widely accepted liability doctrine for the crime of aggression. In its
first decision, Tadic, the ICTY read the doctrine of JCE into its statute.197
The core of the concept of enterprise participation is “a common plan,
design or purpose which amounts to . . . the commission of a crime.”198 The
ICTY has categorized three forms of enterprise participation: shared intent
to bring about a certain offense,199 organized systems of repression and illtreatment,200 and criminal acts beyond the common design, but “a natural
and foreseeable consequence of effecting” it.201 The first indictment relying
“explicitly on JCE was confirmed on June 25, 2001.”202 According to
Danner and Martinez,
Of the forty-two indictments filed between that date and January 1, 2004,
twenty-seven (64%) rely explicitly on JCE. . . .
. . . If all indictments that include charges that the defendant acted ‘in
concert’ with others are viewed as implicitly employing a JCE theory,
then thirty-four of the forty-three indictments confirmed between June
25, 2001 and January 1, 2004 (81% of the total) incorporate JCE.203

Five years after the concept of JCE was read into the ICTY Statute, it
was explicitly incorporated into the Rome Statute of the ICC in Article
25(3)(d). The ICC can, and likely will, choose to build on the ICTY
jurisprudence when interpreting the statutory provision on JCE.
The strength of the concept of JCE, in light of the changing nature of
organizations, is its capacity to locate individual responsibility within a
wide range of organizational models. The emphasis of superior
responsibility, as Osiel points out, is on the chain of command, while
197. Danner & Martinez, supra note 193, at 104 (describing how the International Criminal
Tribunal of Yugoslavia read the JCE into Art. 7(1) of the ICTY Statute).
198. Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 772 (Jan. 14, 2000).
199. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 195 (July 15, 1999).
200. Id. ¶ 202.
201. Id. ¶ 204.
202. Danner & Martinez, supra note 193, at 107.
203. Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted).
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enterprise participation “is more consonant with differing dimensions of
mass atrocity, where malevolent influence travels through informal and
widely dispersed networks.”204 The weakness of the JCE concept is its
breadth. Unlike the concept of conspiracy, which relies on an actual
agreement among individuals, JCE is based on a legal fiction—that the
individual participants are united by a common purpose, a common
purpose imagined by the bench.205 Because the concept is based on a legal
fiction, it suffers from a serious weakness from the perspective of legality.
The defendant cannot know how expansively the tribunal will imagine the
common purpose to be prior to its determination, and therefore, whether he
or she will be included within the ambit of the crime. For this reason,
critics of the concept of JCE, such as Osiel, consider it to be “dangerously
illiberal.”206
However, the JCE doctrine, when applied to the definition of the
crime of aggression, becomes bounded by the crime’s leadership qualifier.
Only leaders of the common plan to commit aggression, individuals “in a
position effectively to exercise control over or to direct” the common plan
(or, under one formulation proposed above, “a [central/focal] person in a
position effectively to exercise control over, [determinatively influence,] or
to direct the political or military action of a State [/Group]”) are included
within the ambit of the concept. This answers critics, such as Osiel, and
makes the concept of JCE viable from the perspective of liberal legalism. If
tribunals continue to create additional categories of JCE, some specifically
tailored to the crime of aggression, the concept, “consonant with the
differing dimensions of mass atrocity,”207 will become still more
predictable and comport increasingly closely with the concept of legality.
The future of individual accountability for the collective crime of
aggression lies in progressively refining the properties of the doctrine of
JCE.
3. Recap and Postscript to Part IV
The conceptual link between the individual and the collective act of
aggression is, as Part IV demonstrates, made up of three properties: a
leadership clause, four conduct verbs, and one or more liability doctrines.
Part IV argues that, in addition to formal or effective control, centrality
within a social network and the influence of an individual within that
network should be included as properties of the leadership clause. In
204.
205.
206.
207.

Osiel, supra note 192, at 177.
Id. at 1771 n.92.
Id. at 1772.
Id. at 1770.
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addition, the solution to the problem with the conduct verbs, based on
Mintzberg’s critique of Fayol, is to further flesh out the properties of those
verbs, which are abstract enough to capture both classic and contemporary
concepts of leadership. Finally, the liability doctrine of JCE, tempered by
the leadership clause of the crime of aggression, rather than the doctrines of
superior responsibility or conspiracy, is the most appropriate option for the
definition for the crime of aggression.
There is, in fact, a fourth conceptual link that this article does not
address in detail because I consider it in an earlier study—the modes of
participation in the crime of aggression contained in Article 25(3) of the
Rome Statute.208 An important conceptual consideration related to the
modes of participation that I do not address in detail in that earlier study is
the uneasy relationship between the conduct verbs (planning, preparation,
initiation, and execution).209 and the modes of participation set out in
Article 25(3)(a)-(d) of the Rome Statute. The following chart eschews
structural theories of perpetration,210 which have only confounded the
SWGCA debate, and instead presents each mode of perpetration and
participation in relation to each conduct verb contained in the SWGCA
definition (plus the leadership qualifier), with the aim of evaluating the
resulting concepts of perpetration/participation that emerge. Problematic
concepts are shaded in gray and the reason they are problematic is
described below the chart.

208. Weisbord, supra note 4, at 190.
209. See supra Part IV.B.
210. See generally Albin Eser, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 767, 781 (Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta & John
R.W.D. Jones eds., 2002) (describing how true “actors” and mere “accomplices” are both perpetrators
and indistinguishable under the unitary perpetrator concept, whereas perpetrators and mere participants
are distinguishable under the differential participation concept since perpetrators have a more direct role
to play in the commission of the crime than participants in terms of causation and are therefore more
blameworthy).
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Conduct Verbs in the SWCCA Definition

Perpetration in Article 25(3)
Participation in Article 25(3)

PLAN

PREPARE

INITIATE

EXECUTE

Commits
Individually

A leader
individually
plans the
commission of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader
individually
prepares for the
commission of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [1].

A leader
individually
initiates the
commission of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader
individually
executes the
commission of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [2].

Commits
Jointly

A leader jointly
plans the
commission of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader jointly
prepares the
commission of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader jointly
initiates the
commission of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader jointly
executes the
commission of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

Commits
Through
Another

Through another,
a leader plans the
commission of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

Through another,
a leader prepares
the commission
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

Through another,
a leader initiates
the commission
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack [3].

Through another,
a leader executes
the commission
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

Orders

A leader orders
the planning of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader orders
the preparation
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader orders
the initiating of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader orders
the execution of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

Solicits

A leader solicits
the planning of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader solicits
the preparation
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader solicits
the initiation of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader solicits
the execution of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

Induces

A leader induces
the planning of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader induces
the preparation
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader induces
the initiation of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [4].

A leader induces
the execution of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

Assists

A leader assists
the planning of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [5].

A leader assists
the preparation
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack [6].

A leader orders
the initiation of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [7].

A leader assists
the execution of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [8].

Provides
Means for
the
Commission

A leader
provides the
means for the
commission of
the planning of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [9].

A leader
provides the
means for the
commission of
the preparation
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader
provides the
means for the
commission of
the initiation of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [10].

A leader
provides the
means for the
commission of
the execution of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

Attempts

A leader attempts
the planning of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack [11].

A leader attempts
the preparation
of an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader attempts
the initiation of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

A leader attempts
the execution of
an act of
aggression/armed
attack.

[1] If a leader prepares individually, there is no one being led.
[2] A collective act cannot be executed individually by a leader.
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[3] If a leader initiates “through another,” how is this different from
just initiating by him or herself?
[4] If a leader induces the initiation, how is this different from just
initiating by him or herself?
[5,6,7,8] Can a leader be an assistant? The word “assists” pertains to
the planning, preparation, initiation, or execution of an act of
aggression/armed attack.
[9] What “means for the commission” of planning does the working
group have in mind? Computers, maps, expert military planners?
[10] What means for the commission of initiation are necessary?
Communication devices?
[11] Under 25(3)(f) of the Rome Statute, an attempt is an action that
constitutes a “substantial step” toward the execution of a crime. Does an
incomplete plan constitute a substantial enough step to justify criminal
responsibility and punishment?
There are two possible avenues the ASP can take in response to these
observations. The ASP can replace the existing conduct verbs with verbs
that are more compatible with Article 25(3). The advantage of his approach
is that, with careful attention to compatibility, the resulting crime would be
more conceptually elegant than the existing concept. Alternatively, the ASP
can accept that some of the modes of perpetration and participation
resulting from the interaction of the leadership clause in the definition, the
conduct verbs in the definition, and the terms in Article 25(3) of the Rome
Statute, are conceptually problematic and leave it to the judges to avoid
them (i.e., the shaded boxes). One advantage of this approach, which
comes at the expense of conceptual elegance, is that it avoids another
protracted debate in the run-up to the review conference by proceeding on
the basis of conduct verbs that states have already agreed to. Another
advantage is that these conduct verbs, borrowed from the London Charter,
have historical resonance. The risk of using the existing model is that an
aggressive prosecutor or an activist bench will one day exploit the
conceptual confusion as an avenue to interpret the provision to capture a
wider range of perpetrators and participants than the signatories to the
statute intended. The above chart offers clearer guidance than structural
theories of perpetration and participation as the ASP defines the crime,
judges interpret it, and legal scholars evaluate their judgments.
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CONCLUSIONS
A. Evaluating the Methodology
The combined scenario planning and grounded theory methodology
that this article begins to develop has strengths and weaknesses as an
approach to drafting the definition of the crime of aggression. The most
important strength is that the methodology shifts the gaze of the drafters
from events that have already occurred and agreements already reached to
the sociological phenomenon that the Assembly intends to regulate and
back again. In this way, it strikes a balance between fidelity to the past and
preparedness for the future. The grounded theory approach, unlike a priori
methodologies, focuses the attention of the drafters on the conceptual fit of
the definition and the sociological phenomenon they intend to regulate. It
offers an incremental way for lawmakers to shape a definition that does not
rely on an initial agreement on a priori assumptions. Taken together,
scenario planning and grounded theory methodologies are more likely than
methodologies focused predominantly on precedent and tradition or efforts
based upon an initial normative agreement to guide the drafters to a welltailored and relevant definition.
What the proposed methodology cannot do is remove politics from the
negotiations. Just as SWGCA delegations chose their preferred precedents
with their nations’ interests in mind, they are likely to choose their favorite
scenarios to advance their political and military interests as well.
Ultimately, the proposed method can only produce an analytically ideal
definition to the limits of what is politically possible. My hope is that
through an open discussion of scenarios and constituent concepts, the
proposed methodology will help clarify the normative commitments of the
drafters so that these commitments can be better accounted for in the
negotiations. If politics is to be tethered to process, as the diplomats
drafting the crime of aggression seem to prefer, the process would do well
to accurately reflect their interests so that these interests are properly taken
into account in the final product.
In addition to balancing fidelity to the past and preparedness for the
future, the proposed method offers a systematic way to move from the
concrete to the abstract and vice versa. This is the primary contribution of
grounded theory. The existing definition contains concrete aspects, such as
the list of acts of aggression in Paragraph 2 (invasion, bombardment,
blockade, etc.), and abstract parts, such as Paragraph 1 (characterizing an
act of aggression as a manifest violation of the Charter of the United
Nations), but these are more often than not inherited from the hodgepodge
of precedents that are the building blocks of the definition. The proposed
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method seeks to more deliberately build concreteness and specificity into
the definition so that the final definition best fits the phenomena it is meant
to regulate. Once again, however, the imperative of designing a definition
that best fits the target phenomena and the realities of politics are regularly
at odds. “Constructive ambiguity”211 and a focus on “relative particulars”212
are not only tools to tailor the definition to a social phenomena, they are
also tools the diplomats use to reach an agreement. The proposed method,
ultimately, is incapable of fully disentangling the two uses.
B. Directions for Future Research
Future research might usefully address the above critiques by
suggesting specific qualitative and quantitative methodological procedures
that would strengthen the overall method. There are no doubt methods of
lawmaking employed in other contexts, both domestic and international,
which address the challenges of drafting a definition that is certain enough
to guide behavior yet flexible enough to capture new contingencies and
where consensus is difficult to reach because of disagreement about first
principles. A useful follow-up study would compare a number of these
methods, draw general lessons about their applicability in a range of
contexts, and also about the challenge of lawmaking in the midst of rapid
social change. Another direction for future research is to apply the scenario
planning and grounded theory approach in a more fine-grained way to
particular components of the definition of the crime of aggression, such as
the concept of armed attack or the leadership clause. Alternatively, the
methodology might be tested in a new drafting scenario, such as the
drafting of a municipal regulation. In short, the methodology that this paper
introduces is preliminary and requires more study.
In relation to the crime of aggression, new research is needed on the
jurisdictional conditions and, in particular, possible solutions to the
controversy in the working group over the appropriate role for the Security
Council in the ICC’s legal process.213 The question of whether the Security
Council should have primary or exclusive authority to authorize an
211. ICC, Assembly of States Parties, 6th Sess., Special Working Group on the Crime of
Aggression, supra note 131.
212. Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1737.
213. See Draft Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime
of Aggression, in ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression,
7th Sess., 2d Resumption, New York, Feb. 9-13, 2009, Report of the Special Working Group on the
Crime of Aggression, Annex I, ICC-ASP/7/SWGCA/2, available at http://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP7R2/ICC-ASP-7-SWGCA-2-ENG.pdf (proposing a draft amendment to
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression that would provide for
the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression); see also Weisbord, supra note 4, at 196-97.
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aggression case has not yet been resolved and it is sure to pose a challenge
at the 2010 review conference.214 Here, Sunstein’s scholarship on
incompletely theorized agreements, mentioned in the introduction, offers a
promising place to start.
Another important question that legal academics might help resolve is
the mechanism for the entry into force of the definition and the
jurisdictional conditions of the crime. The ASP will need to decide whether
Article 121(4) of the Rome Statute, 121(5), or some combination of the two
controls the entry into force of the aggression provisions.215 Article 121(4)
requires seven-eighths of the ICC’s States Parties to deposit their
ratifications or acceptance of the amendment with the UN Secretary
General before the amendment comes into force. Once this threshold is
reached, the amendment binds all States Parties. Article 121(5), by
contrast, only requires acceptance by two-thirds of States parties to come
into force. However, it only binds States Parties that have deposited
instruments of ratification or acceptance. One important and unresolved
controversy is which article—or combination of articles—should be
employed. Another key question requiring further research is how the
definition of aggression would apply to States Parties that have not
accepted the amendment under either 121(5) and to non-states parties
attacked or attacking a State Party.216
C. The Future of the Crime of Aggression
The criminal prohibition of international aggression has been an
aspiration among legal scholars and statesmen for approximately a
century—at least since the Allied victors of World War I tried
unsuccessfully to try Kaiser Wilhelm II and hold him responsible for the
war.217 The idea is both sticky and resilient. The repeated attempts to define
and enforce the crime of aggression since the Nuremberg Trials indicate
that the idea has captured the legal imagination and that it will continue to

214. See ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 5th
Sess., Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ¶ 8, ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/1
(Nov. 29, 2006).
215. See generally Roger S. Clark, Ambiguities in Articles 5(2), 121 and 123 of the Rome Statute,
41 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 413 (2009).
216. See ICC, Assembly of States Parties, Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, 7th
Sess., Report of the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, Annex II, ICCASP/7/SWGCA/2, (discussing issues related to article 121, paragraph 5).
217. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associate Powers and Germany art. 227, June 28,
1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188; see also Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
on Enforcement of Penalties, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Conference (1919), reprinted
in 14 AM. J. INT’L L. 95, 116-17 (1920).
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attract new supporters, even after repeated failures to implement it. The
adoption of the Rome Treaty in 1998, a major advance in the rapidly
evolving post Cold-War international criminal justice system, has created a
context in which the crime may finally be defined and enforced. Four
possible scenarios present themselves.
The first scenario is that the Review Conference agrees upon a
definition and jurisdictional conditions in 2010. Judging from the SWGCA
negotiations, if states agree upon a definition, it will be a narrow one. The
risk is that the ICC will only apply the definition to isolated leaders in weak
states. The hope is that states will incorporate the definition into their
national criminal codes, as many have begun to do even pending an
amendment to the Rome Statute, and that the definition will help
discourage political and military leaders from attacking their neighbors.218
Another possible scenario is that states will agree upon a definition in
2010, but not the jurisdictional conditions. In this case, the ICC will not be
able to prosecute aggression cases until States Parties at a subsequent
review conference amend the Rome Statute to add a jurisdictional trigger.
In this scenario, States Parties incorporating the definition into their
national criminal laws will still be able to prosecute aggression cases, even
if the ICC is not. The day may come when the definition is widely accepted
in national jurisdictions and this generates enough momentum among
States Parties to insert jurisdictional conditions into the Rome Statute,
allowing the ICC to proceed.
A third scenario is that the Review Conference fails to agree upon
both the definition and the jurisdictional conditions in 2010. Though this
may result in a period where States are less motivated to define the crime,
if the history of the twentieth century is any indication, the idea will
resurface again at the end of a destructive armed conflict that detrimentally
affects enough powerful states. With regular ICC review conferences on
the horizon, there will be ample opportunity to define the crime and
implement it when the conditions are ripe.
Under the final scenario, the delegations fail to define the crime, the
jurisdictional trigger, or the method of implementation at the review
conference and the idea finally withers. Though the death of what some
consider an ill-conceived idea may appeal to even thoughtful commentators
within the international legal establishment,219 this scenario is unlikely. The
218. See generally Evaluating Domestic Legislation on the Customary Crime of Aggression under
the Rome Statute’s Complementarity Regime, in THE ICC’S EMERGING PRACTICE: THE COURT AT FIVE
YEARS 725-54 (Göran Sluiter & Carsten Stahn eds., 2009).
219. See generally Mattias Shuster, The Rome Statute and the Crime of Aggression: A Gordian
Knot in Search of a Sword, 14 CRIM. L.F. 1 (2003).

COPY OF WEISBORD_FMT3.NOV18.DOC

2009]

11/20/2009 12:53:44 PM

CONCEPTUALIZING AGGRESSION

67

sociological changes that are allowing small groups and even individuals to
wage war against states call for an individualistic basis of regulation.
Though other crimes, such as terrorism, might cover similar ground, the
crime of aggression has proven to be a legal idea too compelling to ignore
and prone to resurface, despite definitional setbacks.
The fate of this charismatic legal idea, it is fair to conclude, is not yet
sealed. Studying it is valuable, whatever the outcome of the drafting
process, because of what it reveals about the possibilities and limitations of
international law and what the crime of aggression, one of the century’s
most fascinating legal puzzles, inspires in terms of method.
APPENDIX220

Article 8 bis
Crime of Aggression
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the
planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position
effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military
action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity and
scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use
of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts,
regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations
General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify
as an act of aggression:
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the
territory of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary,
resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of
force of the territory of another State or part thereof;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory
of another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of
another State;
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(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces
of another State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air
forces, or marine and air fleets of another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory
of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention
of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their
presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating
an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups,
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its
substantial involvement therein.

